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According to the brave description of American administrative law scholars, the FCC is called an "independent
agency." This means that formally we belong neither to
the Executive branch - we are not a Cabinet agency
nor report to one - nor to the Legislative Branch.
Rather, we follow a statutory mandate from the Congress, and have staff of civil servants to carry it out.
So much for the theory.'

called processing guideline which essentially provides that television stations which broadcast
three hours-per-week of programming "specifically designed" to serve the educational and informational needs of children will be found in compliance with the their general obligation under
the Act.5 The new rules emerged from a titanic
struggle in which quantification became the focal
issue. Children's advocates touted quantification
as the only effective means of provoking the
broadcast industry to increase the amount of educational programming for children. 6 Broadcasters saw quantification as anathema, an intrusive
government edict intolerable under the First
Amendment." Now, the zealous advocates of
quantification are trumpeting a significant vic-

Regulation of television programming reached
a watershed with the adoption of the Federal
Communications Commission's ("FCC" or "Commission") latest rules implementing the Children's Television Act of 1990 ("Act"). 2 For the
first time since the FCC deregulated broadcast
services over a decade ago,3 the Commission defined one element of a broadcast television station licensee's obligation to operate in the public
interest in quantitative terms.4 It adopted a so* James J. Popham is Vice President, General Counsel of
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the interests of stations not affiliated with the three
established networks (ABC, CBS and NBC). Mr. Popham
previously served as Vice-President, Congressional Relations
and Deputy General Counsel of the National Association of
Broadcasters (1972-82). The author wishes to thank Jo P.
Popham, Legal Assistant in the CBS Washington Law
Department for her invaluable research, insight, editorial
assistance, support and encouragement in the preparation of
this article. The views expressed are strictly those of the
author.
I FCC Chairman Reed E. Hundt, Reshaping Regulation,
Remarks Before the Munich Circle Conference I (Sept. 25,
1995) (challenging the theory that the FCC is an independent agency) [hereinafter Hundt Munich Conference Remarks].
2
In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming and Revision of Programming Policies for
Television Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd
10660 (1996) (implementing rules for the Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996-1000,
codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a, 303b, 394 (1994)) [hereinafter
1996 Report and Order ].
3
See e.g., In re The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and
Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Sta-

tions, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1077 (1984) ("conclud[ing] that modifications to the existing regulatory system
are appropriate .

.

. [and that] market incentives will ensure

the presentation of programming that responds to community needs and provide [sic] sufficient incentives for licensees
to become and remain aware of the needs and problems in
their communities.") [hereinafter 1984 CommercializationReport and Order].
4
1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 1.
5
Id. para. 115; see also Broadcast Services; Children's Television, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,981, 43,998 (1996) (to be codified at
47 CFR § 73.671(c)). The other salient feature of the Commission's order was a new, strict definition of "programming
specifically designed to serve the educational and informational needs of children," which the Commission has chosen
to refer to as "core" educational programming. 1996 Report
and Order, paras. 73-76.
6
See, e.g., Comments of Center for Media Education to
the Notice of ProposedRulemaking in MM Dkt. No. 93-48, at 1114, 17 (Oct. 16, 1995).
7
See, e.g., Comments of the National Association of
Broadcasters to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in MM Dkt.
No. 93-48, at 26 (Oct. 16, 1995) [hereinafter NAB Comments].
In the ultimate compromise NAB undoubtedly swallowed
hard in accepting even a quantitative processing guideline.
1
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tory.8 At the same time, many who have carried
the banner of broadcasters' resistance to quantification over the years are wondering why an idea
successfully resisted for so long suddenly gained
sufficient momentum to become enshrined in the
FCC rules.9
The simple answer is a confluence of passionately .pursued good intentions and effectively
leveraged political forces which gave quantification unprecedented momentum. Neither of
these factors, however, assure a sound result. To
the contrary, they raise danger signals which dictate an especially skeptical attitude about the results they have spawned. 10 Furthermore, the new
rules are the product of raw political compromise.
This also prompts questions and a concern that
tenets of sound decisionmaking have been abandoned in favor of political expediency." A final
reason for concern arises from the nature of the
debate. Despite some extraordinarily fruitful moments, the FCC's deliberations over the quantification question often better resembled a bench

clearing brawl between two minor league teams
struggling to stay out of last place on the final day
of the season, than a rational exchange among
principled advocates on the opposing sides of the
issue.

Harry A. Jessell, Peggy Charren: Victory at Long Last,
& CABLE, Aug. 12, 1996, at 20.
9 No doubt ought to exist that in the matter of quantitative standards, for both sides, it was indeed "the principle of
the thing." As a practical matter, the magnitude of the victory on one side and the defeat on the other appears marginal. Indeed, the victory may well be pyrrhic for children's
advocates. For broadcasters, the defeat in practical terms
may well better resemble a victory when all is said and done.
10 As former Commissioner Glen Robinson once observed in this very context:
There is an especially seductive appeal to the idea of
"protecting" children against television. There are areas
where the prospect of governmental control of programming has only to be suggested to evoke opposition and
antipathy. This is not one of them. It is with respect to
children's television that our strongest instinct is to
reach out and put the clamp of governmental control on
programming. For this reason, regulation of children's
programming raises the most subtle and the most sensitive of problems. Everyone recognizes the free speech
dangers of governmental control of political broadcasting. Not enough people appreciate the far more subtle
problem of governmental control when it is extended
into an area like this one, where there is widespread
popular sentiment supporting some measure of governmental control. But if the First Amendment is to mean
anything at all, it obviously does not mean that we can
make judgments on the basis of majoritarian sentiment
alone.
In re Petition of Action for Children's Television (ACT) for
Rule Making Looking Toward the Elimination of Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Programming
and the Establishment of a Weekly 14 Hour Quota of Children's Television Programs, Children's Television Report and
Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 37 (1974) (separate statement
of Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson) [hereinafter 1974 Chil-

dren's Television Report and Policy Statement].
II Such compromises also reduce the prospects for judicial review. In this case, the most likely antagonist of the
Commission's new rules, the National Association of Broadcasters, has committed not to seek judicial review, despite its
long-standing hostility to any form of quantitative standard.
Letter from Edward 0. Fritts, President, National Association
of Broadcasters, to The Honorable William J. Clinton, President of the United States 1 (July 28, 1996) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus).
12 See In re Petition of Action for Children's Television
(ACT) for Rulemaking Looking Toward the Elimination of
Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Programming and the Establishment of a Weekly 14 Hour Quota
of Children's Television Programs, Notice of Inqui7y and Notice
of Proposed Rule Making, 28 FCC 2d 368, 368-69 (1971) (referring to Petitionfor Rule Making of the ACT, RM 1569 (Feb. 5,
1970) [hereinafter 1971 Notice]. Ten years earlier, the FCC's
first recognition of a licensee's responsibility to provide programming which served the needs of children. Report and
Statement of Policy Re: Commission En Banc ProgrammingInquiry,
44 FCC 2303 (1960). The ACT petition further requested
that neither sponsorship of nor commercials on children'
programming be allowed and that performers on children'
programming be forbidden to mention products, services, or
stores during children's programming. Id. With respect to
children's programming, ACT asked that programming be
directed to specific age groups during specified dayparts
(e.g., primary, ages 6-9, programming between 4 p.m. and 8
p.m. daily and between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. on weekends). Id.
13
1971 Notice, supra note 12. This proceeding ended in
1984. In re Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices, Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 634, para. 46
(1984), affd sub nom., Action for Children's Television v. FCC,
756 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (ACT II) [hereinafter 1984 Programming Report and Order].
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BROADCASTING

I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHILDREN'S
TELEVISION PROGRAM REGULATION
The issue of quantifying local television stations' obligation to provide educational and informational programming for children hardly was
new to the Commission in 1996. More than
twenty-five years ago, the same parties which proclaimed victory on August 8, petitioned the FCC
to require stations to broadcast fourteen hours
per week of children's programming.12 Ten
months later a divided Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, thereby initiating a proceeding which was to
last for thirteen years.13 Foreshadowing the controversy which was to dog the issue, three commis-
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sioners dissented, while one of the four commissioners voting to issue the notice lamented that
the Commission had compiled a massive record
over the preceding ten months, but had failed to
make any specific proposals.14
The fundamental conflict between the First
Amendment objections to specific Commission
rules, as advanced by broadcast and advertising interests, and protecting and promoting the interests of children, was acknowledged and articulated by the Commission:
In support of their First Amendment and Section 326
contentions, the parties so arguing cite a number of
well-known cases .

. .

. We recognize the importance

and significance of these pronouncements and the concepts expressed in them. It may be that, ultimately, we
will conclude that they substantially limit otherwise appropriate Commission actionin this area. But it is also
apparent that there are high public interest considerations involved in the use of television, perhaps the most
powerful communications medium ever devised, in relation to a large and important. segment of the audi15
ence, the nation's children.

When all was said and done, the Commission
had amassed a sixty-three volume file of formal,
informal comments, and data plus 1,252 pages of
transcript from three days of panel discussions
and three more days of oral argument.' 6 .
Nine months after the oral arguments, the
Commission adopted its Children's Television Re14
1971 Notice, supra note 12, at 373 (concurring opinion
of Commissioner Nicholas Johnson). Commissioner Johnson also complimented the unprecedented interest of conservative Republican FCC Chairman Dean Burch in the matter of children's television:
Chairman Burch has taken a leading role in attempts to
bring Big Broadcasting closer to a realization of its awesome responsibility for one of our nation's most precious resources: our children. He invited the ACT
members to an almost unprecedented personal presentation by private citizens of their concerns to the Commissioners. He supported putting their proposal out for
comment. He has delivered public speeches to broadcasters and written article [sic] on the subject He has
met privately with network executives.
Id. at 374.
15 Id. paras. 6-7.
16
1974 Children's Television Report and Policy Statement,
supra note 10, paras. 4-6.
17
Id. at 1.

18
19

Id. para. 20.

Id. paras. 20, 22. The Commission added that "we expect to see a reasonable amount of programming which is
particularly designed with an educational goal in mind." Id.
para. 22. Examples of such programming noted by the Commission were CaptainKangaroo, Multiplication Rock, and Wild
Kingdom. Id. at 7 n.8.
20
Id. para. 25
21
Id. para. 26.

3

port and Policy Statement.1 7 No rule requiring
stations to broadcast a certain amount of children's programming was adopted.18 However,
the Commission left no doubt that serving the
child audience was an essential element of a licensee's public interest obligation. The Commission
called for a "meaningful effort" with respect to
presenting overall children's programming and
stated that "license renewal applications should
reflect a reasonable amount of programming
which is designed to educate and inform - and
not simply to entertain."1 9 With respect to agespecific programming the Commission declined
to require any particular breakdown of programming among age groups, but again stated its expectation that "all licensees make a meaningful effort in this area." 2 0 Finally, the Commission
noted that most children's programming was
broadcast on Saturday and Sunday mornings.2 1 It
called this scheduling pattern unreasonable and
said it expected "to see considerable improvement in scheduling practices in the future." 2 2
The industry was given until January 1, 1976, to
come into full compliance with the new policy. 23
The Commission also kept the proceeding open
to permit it to monitor and evaluate industry performance under the new policy statement and

Id. para. 27.
Id. para. 58. With respect to advertising, the Commission adopted no rule prohibiting advertising during children's programming, but noted that if it had done so, it
likely would have considered a quantitative programming requirement necessary. Id. para. 19. The Commission determined instead to rely on industry self-regulation to reduce
advertising voluntarily, in the form of the now-defunct NAB
Television Code, and an agreement by the Association of Independent Television Stations, Inc. ("INTV"). Id. para. 42
n.12. The Commission also required stations to employ
"[s]pecial measures ... to insure that an adequate separation [between program content and commercial messages] is
maintained on programs designed for children." Id. para.
49. The NAB Code was abolished in 1982 following a Department ofJustice antitrust suit. BroadcastersReconsider Voluntary
Programming Code. BROADCASTING, Oct. 2, 1989, at 50. In the
absence of regulations or a voluntary program code, the
commercialization of children's programming increased
steadily over the next six years. H.R. REP. No. 101-385, at 7
(1989)'(citing to several studies, including the 1988 NAB Survey) [hereinafter House Report]; see also S. REP. No. 101-227, at
9-10 (1989) [hereinafter Senate Report). Consequently, Congress stepped in and enacted statutory advertising time limits
for children's programming as part of the Children's Television Act of 1990. House Report at 8; see also Senate Report at 10.
The statutory advertising limits are codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 303a(b) (1994).
22
23
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clear that general improvements must be forthcoming .. . in increased educational and informative programming."2 " Thus, the court resisted the
temptation to cast itself in the role of primus inter
pares in its "partnership" with the FCC and held
the Commission's action a "reasoned exercise of
its discretion."3 0
Within months, the issue, again, was joined at
the FCC. Blanket oppositions were filed against
the license renewal applications of television stations in Los Angeles and San Francisco in November 1979.31 The petitioners also requested that
the children's television proceeding be reactivated.3 2 By January, NAB had responded with a
study, which, according to NAB, showed that sta-

tions were providing children's programming of
"adequate diversity, educational and cultural content and scheduling on other than weekends to
satisfy" the Commission's policy.3 3 ACT responded with a Petition for an Inquiry and Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking.3 4 Therein, ACT disputed NAB's conclusions and, again, urged the
Commission to adopt a better definition of children's programming and rules specifying the
amount, nature, age-specificity, and scheduling of
children's programming.3 5
Meanwhile, the Democrats regained control of
the White House with the election in 1976 of PresidentJimmy Carter. President Carter appointed a
new FCC Chairman in the person of Charles D.
Ferris, a long-time prot~g6 of then Speaker of the
House "Tip" O'Neill. In 1978, only a year after
the ACT I decision, the new Chairman launched
an inquiry into children's television programming
and advertising practices.3 6 The Commission
pointed to its "long established intention to revisit
the issue of voluntary compliance with our children's television programming and advertising
policies."3 7 In its Second NOI, the Commission
posed an extensive array of questions concerning
the overall amount of children's television programming, the amount of educational and informational children's programming, age-specific
programming, program scheduling, and overcommercialization of programs designed for children.3 8 The Commission also re-established its
Children's Television Task Force which was directed to evaluate the effectiveness of industry
self-regulation with respect to children's programming and advertising. 9 For the first time, the
Commission also embraced the advent of new
video technologies, primarily cable television, and
directed the Task Force to "investigate the overall
effect of new technologies and alternative sources

24
1974 Children's Television Report and Policy Statement,
supra note 10, para. 58. The Chairman of the Commission
emphasized this in testifying to Congress nine months after
the policy statement was adopted. Broadcast Advertising and
Children: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications, of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong.
367 (1975) (statement of Richard E. Wiley, Chairman, FCC).
25
1974 Children's Television Report and Policy Statement,
supra note 10, at 36 (separate statement of Commissioner AbbottWashburn).
26
Id. at 37 (separate statement of Commissioner Glen 0.
Robinson).
27
See generally Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564
F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter ACT I].
28
Id. at 459.

Id. at 480.
Id. at 482.
31
See In re Children's Programming and Advertising
Practices, Second Notice of Inquiry, 68 F.C.C.2d 1344, para. 21
(1978) [hereinafter Second NOI].
32
Id.
3
Id. paras. 22-23.
34
Id. para. 25 (ACT petition filed Feb. 23, 1978).
ss Id. paras. 25-26.
36
Second NOI, supra note 31, at 1344.
37
Id. para. 19.
38
Id. paras. 37-45.
39
See In re Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 F.C.C.2d
138, para. 4 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 NPRM].

more readily revisit the issue if the industry failed
to respond as expected. 24
The Commission's decision in 1974 was unanimous. One Republican Commissioner called the
policy statement "a milestone in the Commission's history."2 5 Another, a Democrat, warned,
however, that "I would not have these efforts interpreted as merely the first step in a continuous
series of measures by the FCC to act as a censor
for children's programming."2 6
ACT sought judicial review of the 1974 Children's Television Report and Policy Statement,
complaining, inter alia, that the Commission
should have adopted more specific programming
rules, as ACT had urged in its initial petition. 27
The court, however, affirmed the Commission.2 8
Noting the First Amendment and policy problems
inherent in program content and advertising
practices regulation, the court found the Commission's reticence to adopt the rules urged on it by
ACT proper. "Heeding that counsel, the Commission has chosen to accord licensees a substantial
measure of their customary discretion in the areas
of programming .

.

. and yet it has made it quite

29

30
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of programming on the availability of children's
programming."4 0
The Task Force presented its report on October 30, 1979.4' The Task Force alleged that
broadcast stations had failed to comply with the
programming guidelines of the 1974 Children's
Television Report and Policy Statement and recommended that the Commission quantify its expectations of broadcasters. 42 According to the
Task Force, the average amount of time devoted
to educational children's programs had shown no
appreciable change since adoption of the 1974
Children's Television Report and Policy Statement.4 3 Network originated educational children's programs amounted to 2.77 hours- perweek per-station on average in 1973-74 and 2.76
hours-per-week per-station in 1977-78. In the
same time span, syndicated programming fell
from 1.42 to 1.14 hours-per-week per-station.4 4
Relying heavily on the Task Force's findings
and recommendations the Commission quickly issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 4 5
Therein the Commission delineated five options
ranging from recision of the 1974 Children's Television Report and Policy Statement to mandatory
program rules.4 6 Other options included a license renewal processing guideline and increasing the number of non-broadcast video outlets. 4 7
The proposed rule would have required stations
to provide five hours per week of educational programming for pre-school children (two to five
years of age) and an additional two-and-a-half
hours per week for school-age children (six to
twelve years of age) .48 The programming would
have had to be scheduled on Monday - Friday between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. 49 Commissioner Abbott
40

Id.

41

Id. para. 5.
Id. paras. 5-6.
Id. para. 16.

42

43
44
45

Id.

48

Id. para. 35.

See generally id. at 138 ("initiating proceeding because
of our long standing concern for improved television service
for children.").
46 Id. paras. 30-46.
47 Id. paras. 40, 46.
Id.
Id. at 156 (separate statement of Commissioner Abbott
Washburn, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5i Id.
52
Id. at 155 (concurring statement of Commissioner
James H. Quello).
53 Id. at 153-54 (separate statement of Chairman Charles
49

50

5

Washburn dissented from the mandatory rule and
processing guideline options.5 0 He called the
Task Force Report "incomplete and misleading."5 1 Commissioner James H. Quello, later to
be a pivotal player in the 1996 deliberations,
called the issuance of a notice of proposed rule
making premature in light of the fact that the
Commission had issued its Notice after providing
interested parties "a mere 45 days in which to provide informal comments on the report."5 2 Even
Chairman Charles Ferris disclaimed any propensity to adopt a quantitative standard:
I would only turn to the option of FCC imposition of a
requirement that each television station air a specific
amount of weekday programming for preschoolers and
school age children with very great reluctance. I would
do so only if I found after we received all comments
and studies submitted in this docket that every possible
alternative had to be discarded as inappropriate.5 3

Comments to the 1979 NPRM were filed in the
summer of 1980. In November, 1980, Ronald
Reagan was elected President. He appointed a
new FCC Chairman, Mark S. Fowler. The new
Chairman's attitude was illustrated by his remarks
following CBS's shift of Captain Kangaroo from
weekdays to weekends:
Frankly, I don't see how you could possibly mandate
more children's television. I believe commercial broadcasters alone should decide what they shall broadcast,
because they have the Constitutional right of free
speech. It's too bad Captain Kangaroo is gone, but the
Government should not be issuing directives about
what should be on the air.5 4

Under the new administration, the children's
proceeding was relegated to the proverbial back
burner at the FCC. When nothing happened for
18 months, ACT, petitioned the U.S. District
Court in Washington to force the FCC to act.55
D. Ferris). Three years later, as a former chairman, Mr. Ferris seemed more amenable to a mandated minimum amount
of educational programming for children. He was quoted in
the New York Times as stating, "We are well aware that it is not
in the economic interest of the broadcasters to aim this kind
of programming at an audience amounting to 16 to 18 percent of the population - age 12 and younger - but if the
obligation falls evenly on all, then no one is particularly disadvantaged." Ernest Holsendolph, Are Children No Longer in
the ProgrammingPicture?, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1982, § 2, at 21.
These two themes were to find new life with the Democrats'
return to the White House - and the Chairmanship of the
Commission - some 12 years later. See infra text accompanying notes 100-8.
54
Holsendolph, supra note 53, at 21.
55
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 546 F.Supp. 872
(D.D.C. 1982) (petition filed on May 18, 1982, 82-2438).
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The suit was dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds.5 6 ACT then asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to review the FCC's failure to act.5 7 Responding to the court, Chairman
Fowler promised that the Commission would
complete action in the proceeding "by the end of
the 1983 calendar year."58

In March 1983, the Commission reopened the
children's television proceeding for the purpose
of updating the record.5 9 The Commission heard
oral presentations and entertained additional
written comments. Shortly, thereafter, the FCC
terminated the proceeding, stating that it found
"no basis in the record to apply a national
mandatory quota for children's programming." 6 0
Instead, the Commission restated the "continuing
duty, under the public interest standard, on each
licensee to examine the program needs of the
child part of the audience and to be ready to
demonstrate at renewal time its attention to those
Id. at 56.
In re Petition of Action for Children's Television
(ACT) for Rule Making Looking Toward the Elimination of
Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Programming and the Establishment of a Weekly 14 Hour Quota
of Children's Television Programs, RM 1569, Dkt. No. 19142
(Dec. 8, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 ACT Petition].
. 5S
NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE AND HISTORIcA. PERSPECTIVE 109 (1985).
In re Petition of Action for Children's Television
59
(ACT) for Rule Making Looking Toward the Elimination of
Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Programming and the Establishment of a Weekly 14 Hour Quota
of Children's Television Programs (Dkt. No. 19142), Public
Notice, Mar. 28, 1983 (announcing Oral Presentations scheduled for Apr. 28, 1983).
See 1984 Programming Report and Order, supra note 13,
60
para. 46.
56
57

61

Id.

Id. para. 32. The Commission stated:
In sum, we can not conclude that statistical studies of the
Task Force or of the other commenting parties in themselves make out a case for increased regulatory concern
or involvement. Properly viewed, the adequacy [sic] of
the programming to which children have access must be
based on a consideration of the whole of the video distribution system. Viewing that system broadly and on an
overall national basis, we find increases in the children's
programming available from the average station, dramatic increases in the number of stations in operation,
increases in the availability of these stations through
cable carriage and improved station facilities, increased
availability of noncommercial programming made possible through the growth of the public broadcasting system, and increased viewing options provided to substan. tial portions of the population by the operation of cable
television systems. In short, there is no national failure
of access to children's programming that requires an
across-the-board, national quota for each and every li62
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needs."6 ' The basic rationale of the Commission's decision was its conclusion that the marketplace had not failed to provide an adequate
supply of educational and informational programming for children. 6 2 The Commission also relied
on the oft-stated constitutional and policy objec63
tions to a quantitative requirement.
In a brief per curium decision the D.C. Circuit
affirmed the Commission's 1984 Report and Order. 6 4 The court held that the Commission properly had considered children's programming
available on cable television and noncommercial
broadcast stations in determining that no uniform, nationwide rule was necessary.6 5 The court
also dismissed ACT's concerns that the 1984 Report and Order relieved licensees of the obligation to provide programming for different age
groups. 66 Ultimately, the court the called the
1984 Report and Order, "a far cry from the wholesale abolition of licensee responsibility perceived
censee to meet.
Id.
63
Id. para. 43.
We thus find ourselves precisely caught between the apparent possibility of accomplishing an extremely important and socially desirable objective and the legislative
and Constitutional mandate and the values on which
they are based which forbid our direct involvement in
program censorship and which require that broadcast
station licensees retain broad discretion in the programming they broadcast. Recognizing that a balance must
be reached, we believe this balance is best struck
through a continued stress on the general licensee obligations emphasized by the Commission in its 1974 Children's Television Policy Statement and through the general requirement that stations provide programming
responsive to the needs and interests of the communities
they serve.
Id.; but see id. at 662-63 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Henry M. Rivera).
64 Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 756 F.2d 899
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (ACT II). Of historical interest, perhaps,
two of the three judges that heard the case later were to be
named to the Supreme Court of the United States, Judges
Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Judge Ginsburg,
however, took no part in the decision. Id. at 900. Judge
Skelly Wright completed the panel. Id.
65
Id. at 901.
66 Id. at 902.
It is absurd to believe that "the programh needs of the
child part of the audience" were thought to be uniform,
from pre-school through elementary school. It seems
clear to us that under the 1984 Order broadcasters faced
with renewal challenges based on the adequacy of their
children's programming can be called upon to explain
why they chose to focus on the needs and interests of
certain age groups or other segments of the child audience, or why they emphasized emotional rather than
cognitive needs.
Id.
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Whereas the matter then appeared dead letter
at the FCC, children's television issues began to
draw Congressional interest. 68 Within months of
the court's decision, bills directing the FCC to
adopt quantitative guidelines to assess licensee
performance had been introduced in both
houses.6 9 The bills went nowhere. In 1987, Senator Lautenberg and, by then, Senator Wirth again
introduced legislation seeking imposition of
quantitative guidelines.7 0 The 100th Congress ultimately did pass the Children's Television Act of
1988.7' That bill, however, contained no quantitative standard. That provision had been jettisoned in order to eliminate broadcast industry
opposition to the bill.7 2 Although the House had
voted 328 to 78 to pass the bill and the Senate had
passed it on a unrecorded voice vote that could
have been stopped by opposition from a single
senator, President Reagan exercised a "pocket
veto" of the bill by not signing within ten days during a Congressional recess. 7 3
The process began again in the 101st Congress
with the introduction of H.R. 1677, the Children's
Television Act of 1989, by Rep. John Bryant (DTX). 74 Eighteen months later H.R.1677 was
passed by Congress.7 5 Again, NAB and broadcast
interests supported the legislation only after it was
revised to include less specific programming obliId. at 902.
After the court decision, ACT turned its attention to
Congress. Penny Pagano, Activists of Kid-TV Turn to Congress,
LA. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1985, Part VI at 1.
69 The "Children's Television Education Act of 1985,"
was introduced by Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.). S.
1594, 99th Cong. (1985). Notable in retrospect among the
co-sponsors was then Senator Albert Gore, Jr. (D-Tenn.). 131
CONG. REc. S10914 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985) (statement of
Sen. Lautenberg). In the House, Telecommunications Subcommittee Chair Tim Wirth (D-Colo.) introduced companion legislation. H.R. 3216, 99th Cong. (1985), 131 Cong. Rec.
H22684 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985); see also Children's TV. Another
Bill From Wirth, BROADCASTING, Aug. 5, 1985, at 28.
70
133 CONG. REC. S10213 (daily ed.July 17, 1987) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg for himself and Sen. Wirth, introducing S. 1505, 100th Cong. (1987)).
7'
H.R. REP. No. 101-385 at 12 (1989).
72 Kari Granville, Regulating Children's TV, NEWSDAY, June
26, 1988, at 80.
73 Irwin Motolotsky, Reagan Vetoes Bill Putting Limits On
TV Programmingfor Children, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 7, 1988, at Al.
74 135 CONG. Rhc. H959 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1989).
75
136 CONG. REc. S13643 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990); 136
CONG. REc. H8536 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990).
76
Senate Kidvid Bill Limits Ads, BROADCASTING, July 16,
1990, at 32; see also Edmund L. Andrews, F.CC. Adopts Limits
on TVAds Aimed at Children, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991, at D7.
67
68

7

gations. 76 On October 18, 1990, the bill became
the Children's Television Act of 1990, Public Law
No. 101-437, without President Bush's signature.7 7
The Act requires the FCC to consider, in its review of a local television station's application for
the renewal of its license, the extent to which the
licensee "served the educational and informational need of children through the licensee's
overall programming, including programming
specifically designed to serve such needs."7 The
Act also permits the FCC to consider "any special
non-broadcast efforts by the licensee which enhance the educational and informational value of
such programming," as well as "any special efforts
by the licensee to produce or support programming broadcast by another station in the licensee's marketplace which is specifically designed to
serve the educational and informational needs of
children."7 9 No quantitative requirement or
guideline was included. In fact the legislative history of the Act, according to the FCC in 1990, expressly rejected quantitative standards.8 0
The Commission's 1990 NPRM proposing rules
to implement the new law added no gloss to the
basic requirements stated in the Act. The Commission simply acknowledged that Congress had
intended to "afford licensees maximum discretion" in fulfilling the programming requirement."' Consistent with its proposals, the Com77 Bill CurtailingKids' TV Ads Becomes Law, CHI. TRun.,
Oct. 18, 1990, at 2.
78 47 U.S.C. § 303b(a) (2) (1994). Congress also directed
the FCC to adopt rules limiting the number of minutes of
commercial matter that television stations may air during
children's programming and to consider in its review of television license renewals the extent to which the licensee has
complies with such commercial limits. 47 U.S.C. § 303a(b)
(1994). Effective January 1, 1992, commercial material aired
within children's programming was limited to 10.5 minutes
per hour on weekends and 12 minutes per hour on weekdays. In Re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming and Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and
Program Log Requirements, Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd
2111, para. 24 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Report and Order].
Enforcement of the commercial limitations portions of the
Act has been taken very seriously by the Commission and has
produced forfeitures up to $125,000. Letter from FCC to
Clear Channel Television, Inc. Licensee, KTTU (TV), 10 FCC
Rcd 3773 (1995) (assessing a notice of apparent liability for a
forfeiture for willful and repeated violations).
79 47 U.S.C. § 303b(b) (1994).
80 In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, Noiice of Proposed Rule Making, 5 FCC Rcd
7199, para. 8 n.28 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 NPRM].
81 Id.
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mission adopted no quantitative standard in its
initial rules implementing the Act. The Commission was emphatic:
The Act imposes no quantitative standards and the legislative history suggests that Congress meant that no
minimum amount criterion be imposed. Given this
strong legislative direction, and the latitude afforded
broadcasters in fulfilling the program requirement, we
believe that the amount of "specifically designed" programming necessary to comply with the Act's requirement is likely to vary according to other circumstances,
including but not limited to, type of programming
aired and other nonbroadcast efforts made by the station. We thus decline to establish any minimum programming requirement for licensees for renewal review
82
independent of that established in the Act.

The Commission, however, did clarify that
short-segment programming might qualify as
"specifically designed" educational and informational programming for children.8 3 In addition,
the Commission adopted a definition of educational and informational programming, noting
that they "cannot properly apply or enforce the
Act, and licensees cannot properly implement it,
without some delineation of the boundaries of the
programming requirement." 4 The Commission
relied on a statement by Senator Inouye (DHaw.), who defined such programming broadly,
as any programming which furthered a "child's intellectual, emotional, and social development."8 5
No one sought judicial review of the Commission's 1991 Report and Order.
II.

THE 1996 DECISION

A.

The Political Landscape
For the first time in twelve years, the American

1991 Report and Order, supra note 78, para. 24.
Id. para. 25.
Id. para. 20.
85 Id. para. 19. The definition adopted by the Commission defined educational and informational programming
for children as "any television programming which furthers
the positive development of children 16-years-of-age and
under in any respect, including the child's intellectual/cognitive or social/emotional needs." 47 C.F.R. § 73.671 Note
(1996).
86 President William Jefferson Clinton first named FCC
Commissioner Jim Quello as Chairman on an interim basis.
See Cindy Skrzycki, D.C. Lawyer Chosen To Be FCC Chairman,
WASH. POST, June 30, 1993, at Fl. In 1993, however, he
named Reed Hundt as Chairman, although Commissioner
Quello remained on the Commission. Id.
87 In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, Notice of Inquiry, 8 FCC Rcd 1841, para. 1
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 NOI]. As was subsequently reported, "[c]riticism from Capitol Hill and public interest

public elected a Democrat president in November, 1992.86 The Democrats controlled the Senate and House, as well.
1. CongressionalPressure
By March 1993, the Commission, and key Democrats in Congress, were noisily unsheathing, if
not outright rattling their sabers over broadcasters' record of compliance with the Act. In fact,
the race was on to see who could lead the charge.
After the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance announced hearings to chide
the Commission for inaction since 1991, the Commission, on March 2, 1993, issued a Notice of Inquiry to examine how its "rules and policies might
be revised to more clearly identify the levels and
types of programming necessary in the long term
to adequately serve the educational and informational needs of children."8 7 At hearings focusing
specifically on broadcaster compliance with the
Act, Chairman Edward Markey (D-Mass.) of the
House Subcommittee of Telecommunications
and Finance, warned that the change of administration meant "[t]he new era has begun.""
Indeed, it had. Chairman Markey never let up.
He conducted extensive hearings in both 1993
and 1994.89 He endorsed a requirement that
broadcasters air a certain amount of educational
programming for children, complaining that
"children's programming remains the equivalent
of a trip to Toys 'R Us .

.

. [and that] the existing

rules have not resulted in the increase in children's educational programming that Congress
envisioned when passing the act."90 Even after

82

groups forced the [FCC] . . . to ask for comments on how it

83
84

might clarify the rules." Kim McAvoy, Kids TV Stays on FCC
Seesaw, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 4, 1994, at 32.
88 Christy Fisher, Broadcast Regulators Turn Up the Heat,
ADVERTISINc AGE, Mar. 15, 1993, at 52. As ACT founder
Peggy Charren was to point out after the Commission
adopted its new rules in August 1996, "[M]y sense is that I
won - I didn't know this at the time, quite - the day Bill
Clinton became President." Harry A. Jessell, Peggy Charren:
Victory At Long Last, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 12, 1996, at
20.
89 Children's Television: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. On Energy and
Commerce, 103d Cong. (1993); Children's Television (Part 2):
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance
of the House Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong.
(1994).
90 Broadcasters and America's Children, BROADCASTING &
CABIE, July 25, 1994, at 77.
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the Republicans gained control of the Congress in
the 1994 elections, now Congressman Markey, as
ranking minority member of the Subcommittee,
stayed on the soap box, calling children's television "the video equivalent of Twinkies: Kids like it,
but it lacks any intellectual nutritional benefit."9 1
Congressman Markey was not alone. Earlier, in
March 1993, Senator Paul Simon (D-Ill.) had
pointed to recent interpretations of the Act by
broadcasters which he characterized as comical. 2
As the FCC's proceedings moved forward, Congressional concern over all aspects of television related to children grew significantly. For example,
in early 1995, several bills were introduced by
Congress that addressed violence on television
and its effect on children.'
In October 1995
Congressman Markey was joined at his "Twinkie"
press conference by Senator Diane Feinstein (DCal.).94

When 1996 began with no resolution of the
FCC's rule making, Congressman Markey called
again for the FCC to adopt a three-hour minimum, complaining that television stations had
substituted The Flintstones and The Jetsons for
truly educational children's programming.9 5 According to the Congressman, the stations were
claiming that those programs taught children
about the "archaeological age" and "the future,"
respectively.9 6 He called on all Members of the
House to support his position to "advance th [e]
91 Djamila Salem, Lawmakers Push New Rules for Children's
TV, LA. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at A14.
92
139 CONG. REc. S2973 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Simon, offering as an example "[s]tations claiming that The Jetsons is educational because it teaches youngsters about space technology").
93 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S3052 (daily ed. Feb. 23,
1995) (statement of Sen. Hollings introducing S. 470, the
"Children's Protection from Violent Programming Act of
1995"); see also 141 CONG. REc. H4177 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Jacobs introducing H.R 1390, the "Children's Media Protection Act of 1995"). Many of the bills
were previously introduced in the 103d Congress, but received increased publicity in the wake of the Commission's
public debate and the shadows of an upcoming presidential
election year. These bills were a precursor to the "Parental
Choice in Television Programming Act" which was ultimately
incorporated into the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-104, § 551, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 551). In what was supposedly a deregulatory piece of legislation, this provision of the 1996 Act raised the level of government control of broadcast content.
94 Salem, supra note 91.
95 142 CONG. REc. H3208-3209 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Markey).
916 Id. Broadcasters vigorously disputed the notion that
such practices were widespread. See e.g., Comments of Associ-

9

children's television agenda at the [FCC]."9 7
Three days after his floor speech, Congressman
Markey and 103 of his colleagues in the House
sent a letter to the four sitting FCC Commissioners urging them "to defend the rights of children
... and to reject arguments against setting a clear,

unambiguous 3-hour threshold for all broadcasters to meet in return for renewal of a license to
use the public airwaves." 9 8 Notably, the letter was
signed by Republicans, as well as Democrats, and
if any Republicans disagreed, their dissents were
inaudible.9 9
2.

Interest from the White House

A new administration also brought an entirely
new view on the issue. In September 1995, President Clinton wrote to FCC Chairman Reed Hundt
urging adoption of a three hour minimum. 0 0
The President stated that "the dissemination of
true educational programming across the public
0 The
airwaves is a priceless gift to our children."o'
next day, Larry Irving, the Assistant Secretary for
Communications and Information, U.S. Department of Commerce, also wrote Chairman Hundt
urging him "to establish clear guidelines requiring broadcasters to air at least three hours, and
preferably more, of children's educational programming each week during hours when children
are in the audience." 0 2 In April 1996, the Deation of Independent Television Stations, Inc. (INTV), to the
Notice of Proposed Rule Making in MM Dkt. No. 93-48, at 13
(Oct. 16, 1995) [hereinafter INTV Comments].
97
142 CONG. REc. H3209 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Markey).
98
Letter from EdwardJ. Markey, Congressman (D-Mass)
to the Honorable Reed Hundt, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission and the Honorable James Quello, Susan Ness and Rachelle Chong, Commissioners, Federal Communications Commission (Apr. 2, 1996) (on file with
CommLaw Conspectus).
99 Indeed, the target of the letter from Congressman
Markey and his colleagues would appear to have been Commissioner Rachelle Chong, a Republican, who only days
before had opposed a three-hour standard publicly for the
first time. Lawrie Mifflin, FCC. Urged to Strengthen Children's
TV, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at A16.

100 Letter from Bill Clinton, President of the United
States, to the Honorable Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission (Sept. 18, 1995) (as appended
to Reply Comments of NTIA, to the Notice ofProposed Rulemaking in MM Dkt. No. 93-48 (Apr. 18, 1996) [hereinafter NTIA
Reply Comments].
101

Id.

Letter from Larry Irving, Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information to the Honorable Reed E.
Hundt, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission 2
102
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partment's National Telecommunication and Information Administration ("NTIA"), headed by
Assistant Secretary Irving, filed formal Reply Comments in the FCC's rule making proceeding
which reiterated the administration's position.10 3
Vice President Albert Gore also joined in the
administration chorus. Addressing the National
Association of Broadcasters' convention in April,
1996, the Vice President reemphasized the administration's position favoring a three hour requirement. 0 4 He repeated the theme in a speech at
the National Cable Television Association convention two weeks later. 10 He also took the opportunity to politicize the issue further by castigating
Republicans for their purported lack of concern. 0 6
At the Democratic National Convention in August 1996, only a few weeks after the FCC adopted
the new three hour processing guideline, the
President touted the new rule as one of his administration's accomplishments, stating that "three
hours of quality children's programming every
week on every network are on the way." 0 7 Vice
President Gore echoed that theme, emphasizing
that "[w]hen our children turn on the TV, let
them learn how to read and add and spell and
think, not how to kill."1o8
B.

The FCC Deliberations

In this context of consistent pressure from the
White House and Congress to adopt a three hour
minimum requirement, one might have taken for
granted a quick, clean decision by the FCC to
adopt such a rule. After all, the Chairman was a
Clinton appointee, one of three Democrats along
with Commissioners Jim Quello and Susan Ness.
(Sept. 19, 1995) (as appended to NTIA Reply Comments, supra
note 100).
103
NTIA Reply Comments, at i.
104
Harry A. Jessell, Gore Calls for Kids Quotas, BROADCASTINC & CABLE, Apr. 17, 1996, at 4.
105
Gore, at NCTA, Challenges Republicans on Kid TV, COMMUNICATIONs DAILY, Apr. 30, 1996, at 1.
106
Id. Later, the President and the Vice President were
to play pivotal roles in the FCC's adoption of the new rules
establishing the three hour processing guidelines.
107
Heather Fleming, TV Gored in Chicago, BROADCASTING
& CABLE, Sept. 2, 1996, at 6.
108

Id.

109 Indeed, Commissioner Barrett, who remained on the
Commission past his term, resigned before the issue came to
a head in mid-1996. Mike Mills, Barrett to Exit FCC by May 1,
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1996, at C3.
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Of the two remaining Commissioners, both Republican, one, Andrew Barrett, was expected to
leave after his term expired in June 1995 and the
other, Rachelle Chong, was uncommitted.1 0 9
Even before the new chairman had been appointed, Chairman Jim Quello had moved quickly
to initiate the 1993 inquiry into the efficacy of the
new law and the FCC's rules.1 10 He later observed
prior to the FCC's en banc hearings on the issue in
June 1994 that "something has to be done; Congress is insisting on it."' 11

After the 1994 hearings, however, the polarization of the issue began. Commissioners Quello
and Barrett stated their opposition to more specific, quantitative requirements. 12 Commissioner
Ness declared children's television her top priority, stating that "[n]o one is keen about regulation
for regulation's sake. But we are keen about having the intent of the Children's TV Act realized."' '3
The issue became formally polarized in April
1995, when the FCC released another Notice of Proposed Rule Making." 4 Among the Commission's
proposals, three focused on the amount of children's educational programming. The first provided for Commission monitoring of programming broadcast in the wake of new measures
adopted to improve the flow of information to the
public and tightening the definition of programming specifically designed to serve the educational needs of children. 1" 5 The second was a
"safe harbor processing guideline" which established an amount of educational and informational programming which would be sufficient to
demonstrate compliance with the Act. 1 6 The
third was an outright requirement that stations
broadcast a set minimum amount of such pro1o

See 1993 NOI, supra note 87.

Commissioners Preparefor Children's Hour, BROADCAST& CABLE, June 27, 1994, at 10. Commissioner Chong also
seemed far from closed to the idea of quantitative guidelines,
although she clearly appeared reluctant to regulate unless
"the amount of children's programming hasn't improved significantly." Id.
112 Jenny Hontz, Barrett, Quello Oppose New Kids TV Regulation, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, July 4, 1994, at 3.
113 Kim McAvoy, Commissioner Looks Out For Kids, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 25, 1994, at 67.
iI

INC

114
In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 FCC
Rcd 6308 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 NPRM].
115
Id. paras. 24-26, 36-44.
116

Id. para. 56.
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gramming.1 7
ByJuly 1995, the positions of the Chairman and
the four sitting Commissioners had taken shape.
Chairman Hundt favored the third option - a
mandatory three-hour rule.'"" He was convinced
that stations lacked the economic incentive in a
competitive marketplace to broadcast children's
educational programming. 11 9 Commissioner
Ness advocated a three hour safe harbor, but
would have left some flexibility for stations to
demonstrate compliance with the Act in other
ways.' 2 0 Commissioner Chong's position
emerged clearly in opposition to a "blanket quantitative guideline."' 2 ' She saw no case for the
proposition that children educational programming had decreased and, therefore, posited that
the rules would fail to pass constitutional muster."12 2 Commissioners Quello and Barrett concurred with Commissioner Chong in their opposition of quantification.1 23
The debate became more personal and antagonistic in September 1995. Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, in its application for Commission
consent to its acquisition of CBS, Inc., voluntarily
committed to double its children's educational
programming to two hours of educational programming per week on the network, and increase
it to three hours per week by 1997.124 As a result
of the Westinghouse commitment, a petition to
deny the application was withdrawn.' 2 5 Commissioner Quello accused Chairman Hundt of extracting the commitment from Westinghouse:
Any such agreement, particularly extracted after signifiId. para. 59.
Christopher Stern, FCCs Hundt Takes Children's Television UnderHis Wing, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 24, 1995, at
117
118

61.

1 9 Id. According to the Chairman, stations fear to
devote resources to children's programming when their competitors are not required to do so therefore, a rule would
place all stations on equal footing and remove that disincentive. Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
See id. ("Other FCC commissioners have raised First
Amendment concerns about requiring broadcasters to air a
minimum amount of educational programming. Not one of
the four other commissioners has embraced Hundt's proposal ..... ).
124
In Re Applications of Stockholders of CBS Inc. and
Westinghouse Electric Corporation for Transfer of Control
of CBS, Inc. Licensee of WCBS-TV, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 11 FCC Rcd 3733, para. 13 (1995); see also Paul Farhl,
Westinghouse to Air More Kid's Shows, WASH. PosT, Sept. 21,

1995, at D12. At the same time, Westinghouse Chairman

11

cant pressure has been exerted by the head of a governmental agency through speeches and meetings, and in
the context of a petition to deny from a public interest
group that could have delayed the sale of the station, is
an affront to the First Amendment and is unlikely to
withstand court challenge.12 6

In a speech the same day, the Chairman told
his audience that "there is ample Commission
precedent for [Commissioner Quello] to consult"
in reference to Commissioner Quello's statement
that he would "'consider long and hard' any
transaction that includes an agreement relating to
the content of a broadcaster's programming."' 2 7
The Chairman also reminded Commissioner
Quello that when he, Quello, was Chairman, the
Commission approved an ownership transfer relying on Pulitzer Broadcasting Company's "representation that it would 'enhance the station's programming for children' by producing and airing
an informational show targeted to children ages
11 to 15 and hosted by teenagers."' 2 3 The Chairman, after disclaiming any prejudgment of the
Westinghouse application, remarked:
If the public interest is served by the concrete, quantifiable promise of one broadcaster to provide educational
programming for children, then surely it is served by
having a clear rule applicable to all broadcasters. Indeed, without such a rule it is hard to see how one
broadcaster standing alone, can keep its promise. The
vigorous competition that characterizes the broadcasting industry will drive even the best intentioned broadcaster to the lowest level, as it does now.' 29

In response, Commissioner Quello called the
Chairman's claim of such a marketplace failure in
children's programming "a farcical notion in toMichael Jordan restates his company's opposition to a
mandatory standard. Id.
125
Letter from Henry Geller, Counsel for Petitioners
United Church of Christ, to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, FCC (Sept. 20, 1995) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus).
126
Commissioner James H. Quello, Enough Already!,
Remarks Before the National Association of Broadcasters
Children's Television Symposium 8 (Sept. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Quello NAB Remarks]. "The Chairman has embarked on
an unprecedented, unrelenting public relations campaign to
urge support for his specific quantitative programming requirements - which are constitutionally suspect." Id. at 3.
127
Chairman Reed E. Hundt, A New Paradigm for
Broadcast Regulation, Remarks Before the Conference for
the Second Century of the University of Pittsburgh School of
Law 5 (Sept. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Hundt Univ. of Pittsburgh
Remarks].
128
Id. at 6 (referring to In re Application of H & C Communications, Inc. and KCCI Television, Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 144, para. 13 (1993)).
129
Id. at 6.
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day's multi-channel, multi-faceted era and represents only the viewer's failure to locate the desired
programs."13 0 Ultimately, Commissioner Quello
posited, "an objective review of the complete record will indicate that broadcasters are already doing an extensive job of airing educational and informational programming for children."' 3 '
In October 1995, Commissioner Quello vented
his resentment of the implication that he was
against children. "I resent the implication that
FCC Commissioners are 'against children' unless
they support imposition of a 3 to 5 hour quantitative standard, particularly when there has been a
significant increase in children's programming
over the past four years."' 3 2 The same day, Chairman Hundt stated that, "[A] reasonable amount
of educational television ought to be something
that every parent and every child can get free over
the air every day."' 3 3
Commissioner Quello also complained that the
Administration, in a call from Greg Simon, Special Assistant to the Vice President for telecommunications policy, urged him to support not only
the Westinghouse commitment, but also the imposition of a three-hour requirement on all stations.' 4 Vice President Gore's office denied the
allegation but did acknowledge that Simon had
called Commissioner Quello to alert Quello of the
President's letter endorsing the three-hour
rule. '3
The verbal jousts acknowledged the political
nature of the debate. The Chairman, for example, readily embraced that the FCC's independence ignored practical -

and political -

reality.

"First, we depend on Congress for our annual
funding .

...

Second, the President appoints me

and my four fellow Commissioners, subject to approval by the Senate .... So even though I'm not
part of the Executive Branch, I am certainly part
of the Administration's communications policy
structure." '365
Quello NAB Remarks, supra note 126, at 4.
Id. at 1.
132 Commissioner James H. Quello, Remarks Before the
Midwest Chapter of the Federal Communications Bar Association 3 (Oct. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Quello FCBA Remarks].
133
Chairman Reed Hundt, Remarks Before the George
Washington University Telecommunications Seminar 4 (Oct.
19, 1995).
'34
Quello Says AdministrationSolicited His Vote on Children's
TV. COMMUNICATIONs DAILY, Sept. 27, 1995, at 2. The allegation was made in Commissioner Quello's letter responding
to an inquiry from Senate Commerce Committee Chairman
1s0
IS
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Commissioner Quello also showed some sensitivity to the fact that he was a Democrat standing
in opposition to a Democratic chairman and administration. "In my 20+ years tenure at the Commission, I have adhered to the principle that I
don't decide important controversial issues on the
basis of whether I am a Democratic or Republican
appointee."' 3 7 With a bit more bite, he added, "I
don't believe I have to disenfranchise myself as a
Commission Democrat, particularly a middle of
the road or conservative Democrat, by opposing
politically liberal, outdated regulations in the
competitive multichannel communications market of today."' 3
Late in October 1995, Commissioner Chong
entered the fray complaining initially that the
"very public and quite heated" debate had focused too much on the issue of quantitative guidelines."13 Not that she was mute on the subject:
On this issue, I will make two points. First, I note that
the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress
considered and declined to adopt a quantitative approach and instead, left it up to the broadcasters to voluntarily meet their children's educational television
commitment.
Second, studies in our children's proceeding show an
increase has indeed occurred from the time the Act
passed. How much of an increase is being debated in
our record as various parties proffer studies, but
roughly, the studies show that such programs increased
from one hour a week to about three hours a week on
average.140

Commissioner Chong also encouraged commenters to address the Commission's proposed
definition of educational and informational programs, as well as "ways to improve the dialogue
between broadcasters and their communities."' 4 '
Meanwhile, not even the first government shutdown in November 1995, could muzzle the debate. At a news conference concerning the shutdown, the Chairman could not resist the
opportunity to urge adoption of a quantitative requirement, while Commissioner Quello opined
Larry Pressler concerning the Westinghouse commitment.
Id.
135
Fields Threatens "War" Over Social Contractsfor Broadcasters, COMMUNICATIONs DmLY, Sept. 28, 1995, at 1.
136
Hundt Munich Conference Remarks, supra note 1, at 1.
'37
Quello FCBA Remarks, supra note 132, at 7.
138

Id. at 5.

Commissioner Rachelle Chong, Remarks Before the
Women in Cable and Telecommunications Political Advocacy Conference 6 (Oct. 30, 1995).
140
Id. at 7.
141
Id. at 5.
139
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The issue retreated from the front pages of the
press later in the year as the FCC received and digested comments filed in response to the Commission's 1995 NPRM. With no clear majority in
his corner, the chairman understandably was in
no hurry to bring the matter up for a vote. Thus,
1995 ended on a quiet note, which carried over
into early 1996.'14
At the end of March 1996, Commissioner Barrett resigned and left the Commission, leaving in
his wake an apparent two-two deadlock on the issue of a quantitative standard - and the name
calling continued.14 4 When Commissioner
Quello, in a speech before the NAB's Children's
Television Symposium, pointed to the variety of
media providing children's programming (including VCRs) ,4 supporters of quantification labeled
it the "'Let them eat VCR's' [sic] approach."14 6
Commissioner Quello called the Marie Antoinette
analogy "a cheap shot."' 4 7 Commissioner Chong
expressed her displeasure that no progress had
been made, and stated that she had offered many
compromise alternatives with no result. She remarked that "[i] t almost makes you wonder if this
is politics or if they really want to do something
for kids."' 4 8
The end of May 1996, saw the first appearance
of a break in the impasse. Commissioner Quello
signaled some flexibility on the quantification issue, stating a desire to end the "internecine war"
that had torn the Commission. 4 9 He proposed

requiring that stations meet a quantification standard "based on industry norms."1 5 0 His proposal
paralleled Commissioner Ness's proposal for a
processing guideline, but stopped short of a fixed
quantitative measure. The Chairman was happy
and called Commissioner Quello's proposal "an
invitation for a conversation."' 5 The conversation, however, still was to have its contentious moments.
Nonetheless, the discussions began in earnest
and within several weeks, both Commissioners
Quello and Chong had indicated their support
for a three-hour processing guideline.' 5 2 In the
interim, the President had reiterated his support
for a three-hour rule and set an industry summit
at the White House on children's television programming before the end of July.'5 Congressman Markey also by then had corralled 220 members of Congress in support of his quest for
quantification at the FCC.15 4 However, Commissioners Quello and Chong still insisted that the
processing guideline retain sufficient flexibility to
allow stations to show compliance with the Act
even if they fell short of the three-hour threshold. 15
If peace had broken out in June, both sides had
returned to the battlements by mid-July. The impasse over a quantitative standard gave way to an
impasse over the degree of flexibility for stations
under the three-hour processing guideline. After
the FCC's Mass Media Bureau staff had prepared
and circulated a draft order adopting the new
rules, Commissioner Quello complained to the

Kid TV Debate Continues Despite Government Shutdown,
Nov. 15, 1995, at 3-4. Commissioner
Quello's remark drew a tart response from Jeffrey Chester,
Executive Director of the Center for Media Education, who
said that it "illustrates once again thatJim Quello is the official representative of the NAB at the FCC ..... Id.
143
The second federal government shutdown which began on December 16, 1995, and extended for a record 21
days also may have contributed to the quiet. See, e.g., David
Espo, Impasse Forces 2nd Shutdown, Chi. Sun-Times, Dec.
16, 1995 at 3; see also Edward Walsh, An Avalanche of Work
Meets Returning Federal Workers, WASH. PosT, Jan. 9, 1996,
at A9.
144
Notably, Commissioner Quello's term was set to expire on June 30, 1996.
"45
Quello NAB Remarks, supra note 126, at 6-7.
146
Lawrie Mifflin, FC.C. Officials Reconcile on Children's
Programs, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1996, at C16.
147
Id.
148
Chong Seeks Commission Level-Meeting on Kidvid Rules,
COMMUNICATIONs DAILY, May 21 1996, at 2.
149
Quello Endorses QuantitativeKidvid Standards Based On
Industry Figures, COMMUNICATIONs DAILY, May 29, 1996, at 2.

Id. at 1.
Mifflin, supra note 146.
152
Lawrie Mifflin, Shift on Children's TV Programs Will
Lead to 3-Hour Minimum, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1996, at 11.
Commissioner Quello's motivation for depolarizing the issue
via new flexibility on his part likely must await his memoirs.
Nonetheless, by late May, the political landscape offered him
no comfort. The President's unprecedented interest in the
issue, Congressman Markey's increasing support from Republican colleagues, and a politically-correct silence from Republican quarters normally vociferous about over-regulation
and preservation of First Amendment values were beginning
to leave Commissioner Quello (as well as Commissioner
Chong) very lonely in his resistance to quantification. Always
astute politically, the dean of the Commission in all likelihood did not relish wrapping up his distinguished career
with a futile, divisive struggle against long political odds.
153 Clinton 'Invites' Entertainment Industry to D.C. Again,
COMMUNICATIONs DAILY, June 12, 1996, at 1.
154 Mifflin, Shift on Children's TV Program, supra note 152.
155 Impasse Develops at FCC Over Flexibility in Children's TV
Rules, COMMUNIcATIONs DAILY, July 11, 1996, at 1.

that repeal of the Children's Television Act would

be a good idea.14 2

142

COMMUNICATIONs DAILY,

150
151
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Chairman that the draft order, written initially to
the Chairman's specifications, contained "unexpected and very unwanted stuff."' 5 6 The Chairman essentially accused Commissioner Quello of
reneging on his support for a quantitative standard, to which Quello retorted, "It's [the Chairman's] way or no way."15 7
Commissioner Ness, whose proposal for a
processing guideline formed the framework of
the new rule, was said to be "very pleased" with
the draft.' 5 Commissioner Chong had substantial reservations and was concerned that the draft
"borders on content regulation."' 5 9 She was
hopeful a consensus still might be reached, but an
impasse again loomed large over the Commission's proceeding. Ifo

As if the substantive impasse were insufficient
fodder for the trade press, a peripheral procedural issue ignited new contentiousness. After the
contretemps erupted, Commissioner Quello
called for the Commission to waive its ex parte
rules to permit the Commissioners and staff to describe the details of the draft order publicly.'16
The Chairman immediately issued a statement opposing any such waiver of the ex parte rules, but
suggesting (albeit conditionally) in lieu thereof
that the Commission simply release the draft order in its entirety.' 6 2 Therefore, he stated his reluctant willingness to release the draft order if the
three other Commissioners agreed.' 6 3
Four days later, Commissioner Quello released
a statement to present his "true position and to
correct mischaracterizations by some who may not
be aware of the unprecedented over-regulatory
details of the draft Children's Television Report
and Order."' 6 4 After reviewing his concerns with
the draft, Commissioner Quello again called for
156
Id. What Commissioner Quello objected to primarily
was a staunch constitutional defense of the rules which heartily embraced the Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969), rationale for lesser First Amendment protection of broadcasting (i.e., spectrum scarcity) - a rationale
which Commissioner Quello feared "would put broadcasters
in 'a regulatory straitjacket for the next five years . . . .'" Id.
Commissioner Quello was adamant that "[tihat's a price I
won't pay and a legacy I won't leave." Id.
'57
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. Some suggested, however, that delays in Commissioner Chong's Office providing suggested edits to the draft
might indicate that her edits never would be forthcoming
and that she ultimately would side with Commissioner Quello
in opposition to the draft. Id.
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public release of the draft order. Again, he complained:
What's also going on here is that a most worthy project,
children's educational and informational programming, with strong support among the public and the
majority of broadcasters, is being cleverly manipulated
to revive outdated and discarded "scarcity" theories of
broadcast regulation ..
None of this is necessary for us to adopt a three-hour
processing guideline that will work effectively and consistently with the purpose of the Children's Television
Act (emphasis in original) ....
Nevertheless, I will say again that I remain committed
to a flexible three-hour guideline for children's educational programming. I hope that the announced White
House summit on children's programming will be successful, and that President Clinton can set the stage for
the creation of sensible, effective rules in a way that the
intractable FCC Chairman has not. 16 5

The next day, Congressman John Dingell from
Michigan, Commissioner Quello's home state,
and ranking Democratic member of the House
Committee on Commerce, wrote to the Chairman
also seeking public release of the draft order.'6 6
Moreover, the Congressman stated his surprise
that "several members of the Commission have
chosen to conduct the debate about their differences of opinion in this matter through the
press."'6 7 Also on July 17, 1996, the Chairman
and Commissioner Ness issued a joint statement
presenting the proposed text of the rule changes
they favor. They expressed their "hope that facts
about the sensible reforms we support will lead to
a more informed public debate about this important issue."168 Within hours, Commissioner
Quello released a statement that, "I for one am
tired of press spin and half-truth. Let's have it all
out, and let's let people make up their own
minds."' 6 9 The actual draft order, however, sup-

161
Statement of Chairman Reed E. Hundt, FCC News,
July 12, 1996.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Statement of Commissioner James H. Quello, Re:
Children's Television Proceeding, FCC News, July 16, 1996,
at 1.
165
Id. at 3-4.
166
Letter from Congressman John D. Dingell to the
Honorable Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (July 17, 1996).
167
Id.
168 Joint Statement of FCC Chairman Reed Hundt and
Commissioner Susan Ness, FCC News, July 17, 1996, at 1.
169 Statement of Commissioner James H. Quello, FCC
News, July 17, 1996.
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posedly remained under wraps at the FCC's headquarters.
Unexpectedly, Communications Daily virtually
mooted the issue of public release of the draft order. The July 17, 1996, edition reported that they
"obtained [a] copy of [the] draft order from [a]
source outside [the] Commission."17 0 The draft
reportedly ran 121 pages with 435 footnotes. 7 1
According to the report, the draft was highly critical of past FCC efforts with respect to children's
television and relies heavily on spectrum scarcity
in buttressing rules against First Amendment challenge.' 7 2 The report otherwise described key elements of new rules in considerable detail.
With the White House "summit" a week away,
the Commission remained locked in impasse
mode. For the White House, the opportunity to
use the upcoming summit as the stage for announcing new FCC rules reflecting the President's desire for a three-hour per week standard
was fading. At the same time, broadcast executives invited to the White House hardly relished
the prospect of being chastised by a popular president in such a public setting. Broadcast industry
lobbyists also saw significant risk in further delaying what already appeared inevitable. If, as anticipated President Clinton was re-elected in November, he would appoint two new Commissioners,
both of which likely would share his position on
children's television. If anything, a FCC without
former broadcaster Jim Quello might be inclined
to adopt even more stringent requirements.
Therefore, neither the broadcast industry nor the
White House remained willing to leave the issue
of children's television to the bickering, deadlocked Commission any longer.

FCC Chairman Reed Hundt immediately responded that the compromise could be adopted
at the FCC's next scheduled meeting on Thursday
of that week.17 5 Commissioner Quello reserved
judgment - as did Commissioner Chong.17 6 As
Commissioner Ness - the original proponent of
the safe harbor processing guideline approach observed, however, Commission adoption of the
compromise was inevitable.17 7
On August 8, 1996, the inevitable occurred.
The FCC released its 1996 Report and Order
adopting the new children's programming rules
dictated by the compromise.' 7 8 Each Commissioner took the opportunity to add their own
"spin" to the Commission's action. First and foremost, Chairman Hundt stated, "[T]oday's action
demonstrates our willingness to listen to the
American people and, at their request, to try to
improve the impact of broadcast television on our
country." 79 Commissioner Quello was measured
in his concurrence:

What Shouting Is All About On ProposedFCC KidVid OrJuly 17, 1996, at 1.
171
Id. at 2.
172
Id. at 1 ("Proof that spectrum scarcity still exists is
found in huge sums paid for spectrum in auctions, draft
says.").
173
The negotiations were conducted by representatives
of NAB and Greg Simon from Vice President Gore's office.
The accord was reached so late in the day that the Monday
New York Times reported a la 'Dewey Defeats Truman" that
"the triumph the Clinton Administration had anticipated
having as a backdrop for today's event - a new Federal Communications Commission rule requiring TV stations to
broadcast each week three hours of educational programming for children - has vanished. A compromise reached
among three of the four commissioners in June disintegrated
in frustration and name-calling in mid-July, although marathon negotiations to patch it together again continued
throughout the weekend." Lawrie Mifflin, Scaled-Back White

House Conference Will Follow Up on Children's TV Programming,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1996, at A8.
174
Remarks at the Children's Television Conference, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1362, 1363 (July 29, 1996).
175
Lawrie Mifflin, TV BroadcastersAgree to 3 Hours of Children's EducationalProgramsa Week, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1996, at
A8.
176
See Chris McConnell, Kids TV Accord Reached, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 5, 1996, at 5. Their reservations centered on the legal rationale, a sticking point in the lingering
impasse. Id. However, the compromise agreement addressed those concerns. Id. In return, the NAB promised
not to challenge the rules in court if the Commission's order
was faithful to the compromise. Id.
177 Id.
178
1996 Report and Order, supra note 2.
179
Id. at 10763 (separate statement of Chairman Reed E.
Hundt).

170

der, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY,

The weekend before the Monday summit,
negotiators for the administration and the broadcast industry sought a compromise.1 73 Just after
midnight on the morning of the summit, they
reached agreement. At the White House later in
the morning the President announced that:
[Tihe four major networks, the National Association of
Broadcasters, and some of the leading advocates for educational television have come together to join me in
supporting a new proposal to require broadcasters to
air 3 hours of quality educational programming a week.
This proposal fulfills the promise of the Children's Television Act, that television should serve the educational
and informational needs of our young people. It gives
broadcasters flexibility in how to meet those needs ....
I urge the FCC to adopt this proposal to make the 3hour rule the law of the land. 7 4
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I am concurring with the Report and Order today to
end a contentious impasse at the FCC. For some time I
have believed that three hours of children's programming per week is a reasonable number, but I was and still am - concerned with establishing a precedent
for future First Amendment incursions. 180

Commissioner Ness appeared gratified. She
stated that, "The central feature of today's ruling
is a three-hour safe harbor processing guideline,
which I have long favored. It offers broadcasters
the twin advantages of certainty and flexibility,
and it is First Amendment-friendly."' 8 ' Commissioner Chong expressed reservations about quantification and the "highly restrictive definition of
'core programming." 8 2 She also addressed the
process by which the Commission had arrived at
its decision:
It has been a long and tortuous road to get us all to this
decision today. Reaching this agreement has been like
making sausage. It was not a pleasant or pretty process.
The end result is palatable, however, and I am pleased
that at last we have been able to achieve this order together.'

III.

THE RULES

Three distinct but overlapping measures were
adopted in the Commission's 1996 Report and
Order. First, the Commission adopted public information initiatives to improve access to information about available programming specifically
designed to educate and inform children ("core
programming").' 4 Second, core programming
was more carefully defined.' 8 5 Finally, the 1996
Report and Order established a processing guideline of three hours-per-week of core programming or its equivalent.' 8 6
A.
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processing guideline under which the FCC staff
will review renewal applications. If a station has
broadcast three hours-per-week of core programming over its license term, then the Commission
staff will approve the children's programming
portion of its license renewal application without
delay.' 7 The three hours-per-week may be averaged over a six month period and may include reThe
peats and reruns of core programming.'
three hours may be demonstrated in either of two
ways, by simply checking a box on the renewal application and providing documentation that three
hours of qualifying core programs were aired
("Category A")' 89 or by a showing of an equivalent
of three hours where "somewhat less" than three
hours-per-week Was aired ("Category B").' 9 o
If a licensee's performance does not qualify to
make a Category A or B showing, its renewal application will be referred to the full Commission."' In this instance, licensees may show compliance with the Act in other ways. They may rely
in part on non-broadcast efforts to augment the
core educational and informational programming
on their station and/or provide sponsorship of
core programming on other stations in the same
market. l2
Remedies for non-compliance with the CTA
may include, in order of increasing severity of the
level of non-compliance, letters of admonition or
reporting requirements, a renewed commitment
from the licensee with a contingent renewal based
on performance, forfeitures and short-term renewals, and finally, in the worst case scenario, a
designation for hearing to determine whether violations of the Act and the Commission's rules war-

The Processing Guideline
The heart of the Commission's new rules is a

180 Id. at 10765 (concurring statement of Commissioner
James H. Quello).
181 Id. at 10768 (separate statement of Commissioner Susan Ness).
182
Id. at 10771 (separate statement of Commissioner
Rachelle B Chong, concurring in part).
183
Id.
184 Id. paras. 52-72.
185
Id. para. 76.
186
Id. para. 120.
187
See id. paras. 120, 131.
188
Id. para. 132.
189
Id. paras. 120(A), 131.
190 Id. paras. 120(B), 133. In a Category B showing specials, regularly scheduled non-weekly programs, short form

programs, and educational and informational Public Service
Announcements ("PSA") would count towards the processing guideline. Id. para. 133. Special consideration will be
given to such programming or core programming aired during prime time and to broadcasters who have invested a substantial amount of money in the development of their own
core programming. Id.
191 Id. para. 135 ("Licensees referred to the Commission
should be on notice by this order that they will not necessarily be found to have complied with the Children's Television
Act.").
192
Id. Sponsorship of core programming on other stations must increase the amount of core programming on the
station airing the sponsored program to exceed the minimum three-hour guideline. Id.
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rant non-renewal of license.19 3
The Commission adopted a processing guideline because a processing guideline was "clear,
fair, and efficient."' 9 4 It clarified its expectations
of broadcasters with respect to their responsibility
to serve the educational and informational needs
of children. According to the Commission, licensees now would know "with certainty and in advance" how to meet their statutory obligations
under the Act.19 5 Thus, the Commission considers the processing guideline an "easy-to-administer regulatory method to determine broadcaster
compliance with the CTA . . . ."'96
Nonetheless, unanswered questions on the
processing guideline remain. For example, what
does "somewhat less" than three hours mean?' 9 7
Which six month period does the Commission
mean? How will the Commission monitor the industry as a whole for compliance with the Act?
The Commission based its decision to embrace
the three hour quantified concept on "inferences
that we can draw from the entire record," rather
than the amount of educational and informational programming already in the market.198 It
considered the three hour minimum to be reasonable six years after enactment of the Act.' 9 9 Finally, the Commission believed its processing
guideline remedied the "shortcomings of [its] initial rules" and provided a counter-balance to the
disincentives to airing educational and informational programming. 200
B.

Core Programming Defined

The critical companion element to the processing guideline is the definition of core programming (i.e., the types of programs which may be
Id. para. 136.
Id. para. 124.
'95
Id.
196
Id. at 10,772 (separate statement of Commissioner
Rachelle B. Chong, concurring in part). Nonetheless, the
Commissioner expressed serious reservation about establishing quantitative processing guidelines as a matter of public
policy. Id.
197 After release of the 1996 Report and Order, Commission staff clarified that "somewhat less" means 2.5 hours to 3
hours averaged over a six-month period and that in no case
would less than 2.5 hours be sufficient for staff approval of
the children's portion of a renewal application. Video tape of
Barbara A. Kreisman, Chief, Video Services Division, Mass
Media Bureau, FCC, speaking at the Legal Session at the National Association of Broadcaster's Kids Symposium, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 2, 1996) (on file with author)- [hereinafter
193

194
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counted towards the three-hour per-week. standard). The Commission defines core programming as educational and informational programming specifically designed to serve the
educational and informational needs of children
which satisfies all six of the following criteria:
1. Serving the educational and informational
needs of children ages 16 and under must be a
significant purpose of the program;
2. the program must air between 7 a.m. and
10 p.m.;
3. it must be regularly scheduled at least
weekly;
4. it must be at least thirty minutes in length;
5. the station must specify the program's educational and informational objective in writing
and the target audience in the station's Children's
Television Programming Report; and
6. the station must provide a listing of educational and informational programs, including the
target age group, to publishers of program
guides. 20 1
Because some broadcasters had claimed general audience and entertainment programming as
programs specifically designed to meet the educational and informational needs of children in
their renewal applications, the Commission decided that its definition was overly broad and that
the requirement that programming be "specifically designed" was not being interpreted correctly by broadcasters. 2 0 2 To conform more with
the express language of the Act, the broad definition of educational and informational television
programming was modified and now encompasses "any television programming that furthers
the educational and informational needs of children 16-years-of-age and under in any respect, inNAB Symposium Remarks].
198
1996 Report & Order, supra note 2, para. 122.
199

Id. para. 121.

Id. para. 129. The three year experimental filings of
yearly compilations of the quarterly children's reports that
will be evaluated. and reviewed after three years will determine future action by the Commission. Id. para. 140. In addition, the Commission will conduct audits of individual stations' performance under the new children's educational
and informational programming rules during the next three
years. Id. The Commission sees no potential sunset of these
new rules. Id. para. 141.
201
Id. at 10750 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.671(c)).
The new core programming definition becomes effective on
September 1, 1997. Id. para. 163.
202
Id. para. 73.
200
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cluding children's intellectual/ cognitive or social/emotional needs." 2 0 3 The Commission
designed the definition of core programming to
provide licensees with "clear guidance" as to how
renewal applications will be processed. 204 Adopting a definition of core programming will precisely define programming that qualifies as core
programming and will provide incentives to increase the amount of these programs. 2 0 5 Moreover, the Commission determined that in addition to facilitating public monitoring of

extent to which this programming can be preempted. 210 Similarly, broadcasters have heretofore relied upon their respective network's and/
or a syndicator's classification of programming as
educational or informational. May they continue
to do so?211 Why did the Commission decline to
provide guidelines on the particular age ranges of
children? 212

broadcasters, requiring licensees to state the edu-

The Commission also adopted several public information initiatives to improve access to information on educational programs for parents and
children. 2 13 Commercial broadcasters must identify core programs on the air at the beginning of
each program in a manner determined by the station. 2 14 Stations also must provide to publishers
of television program guides information which
identifies core programs and indicates the target
age group the core program is intended to
.reach. 2 15 Lastly, stations must place, on a quarterly basis, in a separate section of their local public inspection files a new FCC Children's Educational Television Programming Report (FCC
Form 398).216 The report will reflect the station's
children's programming efforts from the preceding quarter and its proposed efforts for the ensuing quarter. 2 17 The report also must include the
name of a designated individual at the station
who will be responsible for collecting comments
and complaints from the public concerning the

cational and informational objectives of core programming will ensure that the broadcasters focus
on these goals. 2 0 6 Likewise, identifying the target
age group for core programs will guarantee that
broadcasters focus on specific age groups and address particular skills appropriate for that aged
child. 2 0 7 According to the Commission, the 7
a.m. to 10 p.m. window for airing core programs
is the time frame in which the maximum number
of children view television. 2 08 Furthermore, in
the Commission's view, programming scheduled
once a week will allow parents to anticipate and
plan for the program and therefore, the program
will develop a loyal audience. 209
Again, additional clarification is necessary if
broadcasters are to comply fully with the new core
definition and produce the results expected by
the Commission. For example, the Commission
left it to the staff to determine the definition of
regularly scheduled core programming and the
Id. para. 79.
Id. para. 80.
205 Id.
206
Id. para. 93.
207 Id. para. 95.
208 Id. para. 99.
209
Id. para. 105.
210 Id. para. 106. However, a few months after the 1996
Report and Order, Commission staff did not yet know how
many preemptions would be too many. NAB Symposium Remarks, supra note 197. The staff stated that if an episode of
203

204

core programming is preempted, it must be rescheduled and

notice must be given to the public if time permits. Id. It was
also indicated that an exception for breaking news coverage
and coverage of natural disasters is likely, but that sports
preemptions may not fall into the category of allowable
preemptions. Id.
211
Commission staff and the panel of legal experts advised broadcasters to not rely only on syndicators, but to view
more than the pilot or first episode of a program to make a

good faithjudgment. NAB Symposium Remarks, supra note 197.

The Commission, however, will permit small stations to rely
on the documentation provided by a network or a program

C.

Public Information Initiatives

syndicator as a means to minimize any burdens in compliance with the public file requirements. 1996 Report and Order,
supra note 2, at 10,745 (Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis,
Appendix A).
212 1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 95. The
Commission left the classification of age groups to the discretion of the broadcaster. Id. However, at the NAB Symposium, Commission staff and legal experts agreed that basically there are three target groups, preschoolers, school aged
children, and teenagers. NAB Symposium Remarks, supra note
197.
213 When Commission staff was asked who these initiatives are supposed to inform, there was the simple answer,
"Moms and Dads." NAB Symposium Remarks, supra note 197.
The public information initiatives become effective on January 2, 1997. 1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 160.
214
1996 Report and Order supra note 2, para. 52. Noncommercial stations are exempted from the public information initiatives portion of the new rules and from the reporting requirements. Id. at 10,684 n.119.
215 Id. para. 57.
216 Id. paras. 65, 68.
217 Id. para. 71.
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station's compliance with the Act.2 18 The name of
the children's programming liaison and the availability of the station's public inspection file must
be publicized.2 1 9 In addition, for a trial period of
three years, stations will be required to file their
quarterly children's reports with the Commission
2 20
on an annual basis.
Through standardized reporting and other
means, these new rules are intended by the Commission to facilitate easy access by the public to
information about children's educational programming. 22 1 In addition, the Commission believes that the marketplace forces which led Congress to enact the new law "can be addressed, in
part, by enhancing parents' knowledge . . .. ."222
According to the Commission, parents can increase a program's audience by encouraging their
children to watch only if they know that a program is educational and when it is scheduled. 223
Increasing the audience size of educational programs will ensure the commercial viability of
these programs. 224 Access to programming information also should provide viewers with the opportunity to influence their local stations through
viewer campaigns to air more and better educational programming for children. 2 25 Finally,
keeping the children's programming report physically separate from other reports in the public inspection file will "ensure ease of access."2 26
Again, despite the Commission's embrace of
"certainty" regarding a station's obligation to the
public, the new rules tend to raise a number of
questions. For example, the Commission set no
guidelines that address the appearance of the onair identifier, e.g. when at the beginning of a program, exactly how long in duration, and what
should the on-air identifier look like?2 27 How
must the public liaison and the public file be pub-

licized?22 8 What, if any, liability does a broadcaster have if program guides misprint the information or do not print them at all?229

Id. para. 62.
Id. paras. 62, 67.
220
Id. para. 68 (requiring "four quarterly reports filed
jointly once a year").
221
Id. para. 47.
222
Id.
223 Id. para. 48.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226 Id. para. 65.
227 The Commission left these specifics to the station's
discretion. NAB Symposium Remarks, supra note 197.
228
The NAB Symposium panel suggested station bulletin boards, ascertainment notices, station websites and on-air
announcements as possible places to alert the public to these
new initiatives, as long as they reach the people in the com-

munity. Id.
229
The NAB Symposium legal panel advised that the licensee is not at risk for violating the new rules if there are
printing omissions or mistakes by the program guide publishers. See id.
230
1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 33.
231
See infra note 276.
232
This is not to say that stations did not provide programming specifically designed to serve the educational and
informational needs of children. They clearly understood
that they had an obligation to do so after the Act passed, and
they complied. See, e.g., NAB Comments, supra note 7, at 3-9;
INTV Comments, supra note 96, at 12-15.
233
Kenneth R. Clark, Will Washington Put The Lid On
Kid's TV?, CHI. TRJB., Dec. 10, 1989, § 5, Tempo, at 1.
234 Judy Mann, Kangaroocide,WASH. PosT, Mar. 18, 1983;

218
219

IV. PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE NEW
RULES
If the Commission is correct in its assessment of
market incentives to produce and broadcast core
programming,23 0 then the practical effect of the
new processing guideline is readily predictable stations typically will provide three hours of core
programming per week, no more, no less. The
minimum will become the maximum. If industry
studies concerning the amount of currently available core programming are correct,2 3 ' the new
rules will actually produce a reduction in the
amount of educational programming for children
on commercial broadcast television. Furthermore, by focusing on a narrowly-defined genre of
core programming, the Commission arguably
eliminated much of the incentive to broadcast
other highly-beneficial types of programming responsive to the educational and informational
needs of children.
Neither argument appears inconsistent with the
evidence. Marketplace incentives to broadcast educational programming for children appear marginal and even may be in a continuing decline. 23 2
When Congress was debating the Act in 1989, one
network executive bluntly stated that, "If the bill
passes, we're going to have to put programming
on which we will lose money on." 2 3 3 Such a statement came as no surprise. CBS years before had
relegated Captain Kangaroo to its weekend schedule and as "the Captain," Bob Keeshan, observed
at the time, "The marketplace has come. into
play."2 3 4 Keeshan explained that CBS had lost
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millions on the show, while competing networks
broadcast profitable adult programming on week-

day mornings. 2 3 5
Adding to the disincentive for commercial television stations to broadcast children's programs
has been the emergence of cable television with a
plethora of programming, including Nickelodeon, a cable network targeted at children. This
fall has already seen continued erosion of broadcast network children's audiences on Saturday
morning, while Nickelodeon continues to post
double-digit increases.2 3 6 Syndicated children's
programming appears to be faring no better. As
Broadcasting & Cable magazine reported recently, "[d] eclining ratings for most shows, loss of
time periods, new competition from the two new
networks and the defection of older kids to other
forms of entertainment add up to a dismal state of
affairs for syndicators."23 7 These other forms of
entertainment undoubtedly include "the growing
range of computer services, new video game technologies and younger-skewing best-selling video
releases."2 3 8 In other words, with an ever-expanding array of entertainment options, children
already seem to be viewing less and less broadcast
television, and any educational program on a
broadcast station or network will face enormous
competition from the entertainment alternatives
offered by these other media and activities.2 39
Dwindling audiences translate into dwindling
revenues. The opportunity cost of scheduling
children's programming, combined with the
higher costs of producing educational, but still
at BI.
Id. Who was notably concerned about the Captain's
plight? None other than then Congressman Albert Gore, Jr.
Id.
236
Michael Schneider, Will CBS, the Biggest Loser, Drop
Out?, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Oct. 14, 1996, at 1, 38.
237
David Tobenkin, Tough Times for Kids Syndicators,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 12, 1996, at 26.
238
Schneider, supra note 236, at 38.
239
Adding to the problem is the concern that children's
viewing has been underestimated by Nielsen. See Chris McConnell, FCC To Study Free Time, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr.
17, 1996, at 6 (quoting FCC Chairman Reed Hundt).
I'm aware that many broadcasters believe that Nielsen
Media Research, the only company of its kind, undercounts younger viewers and is otherwise, in the words
of NBC's chief audience researcher, 'measurably deficient in reliability, accuracy and utility.' If this is true, it
harms free TV, harms competition and harms the public
interest. I think the FCC should look into it.
Id.
240
A more optimistic appraisal is provided by
235
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entertaining programs, creates strong incentives
for stations to abandon the genre in favor of more
lucrative fare. The Commission's fear that these
rules are necessary to assure that stations continue
to provide educational programming for children
2 40
hardly may be dismissed.
Under these market conditions, stations can be
expected to do no more than they perceive is required of them. 2 4 1 Stations will make for the
Commission's new safe harbor - three hours of
core programming per week - at top speed.
With neither an economic nor a regulatory incentive to broadcast more than three hours of such
programming per week, stations will broadcast a
uniform three hours-per-week of core programming and rest assured that they are in compliance
with the Act.
This action could produce two adverse effects.
First, the overall amount of core programming
actually may decline. Industry studies have shown
that stations on average have been broadcasting
in excess of three hours of educational programming for children each week, the majority of
which was scheduled after 7 a.m. 2 4 2 Whereas a
few stations might have to provide additional programming to meet the processing guideline, the
industry average will tend to decline to the threehour level established by the Commission, because those stations which presently exceed the
guideline may now adhere strictly to the threehour compliance standard.
Second, the amount of beneficial programming
which falls outside the Commission's strict definiZenithmedia:
The prize will seemingly go to the network/programmer
who develops a show that entertains children long
enough to also educate them . . . . What this season -

though it has been tough on network programmers and
syndicators - has shown is that even in this time of technology-savvy, videotape-addicted, Internet surfing kids,
good television still has the power to draw them in,
although they may easily, unpredictably shift between
viewing options.
Television Bulletin Number 41, Children's Television: An Update,
Zenithmedia, (Zenith Media Services, Inc., New York, N.Y.),
Feb. 26, 1996, at 4-5.
241
What ought be questioned, however, is whether a
general requirement versus a quantitative guideline would be
the better impetus to production and broadcast of educational programming for children. This was the issue before
the Commission. The Act already imposed a general requirement, which had prompted stations to provide considerably
more educational programming for children. See supra note
232.
242
See infra note 276.
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tion of core programming will diminish. Stations
will have no remaining regulatory incentive to
broadcast specials or short-segment interstitial
programs, although these types of programs have
been highly responsive to the educational and informational needs of children .243
V.

POTENTIAL LEGAL INFIRMITIES

As a result of the compromise, 2 44 no requests
for reconsideration were filed with the Commission. No petitions for review were filed in the
court of appeals. For the moment, therefore, the
Commission's order is secure and intact. This
hardly should obscure the oft-compelling legal
case which might have been, and might yet be,
mounted against the rule.2 45
A.

The Rules Impose Specific Programming
and Scheduling Requirements Which
Contravene the Scheme of Regulation
Contemplated by the Communications Act
of 1934.

1.

While Cloaked in an Aura of Flexibility, the
Processing Guideline Is For All Intents and
Purposes, a Rule.

Whether read as a three hour or a two-and-ahalf hour "plus change" standard, the processing
guideline essentially requires stations to broadcast
a set amount of a very specific type of programming each week. The Commission itself describes
the processing guideline as "a clear benchmark
for assessing broadcasters' performance."2 4 6
Moreover, the Commission states that:

21

Act. Given the modest nature of the guideline described in Categories A and B, we expect few broadcasters will fail to meet this benchmark.2 47

As Commissioner Ness emphasized, "Category
B is not a safe haven for those whose commitment
is lacking."2 4 She further observed, that the safe
harbor processing guideline is "certain, for it establishes a clear level of expectation: three-hours
- a mere two percent of the broadcast week."2 4 9
In fact, even President Clinton described the rule
as "a new proposal to require broadcasters to air 3
hours of quality educational programming a
week." 25 0 A Federal Communications Commission with two new Clinton appointees may be expected to focus much more on the certainty than
the flexibility in the new rules.
Broadcast licensees will have the same tendency
to embrace certainty. No station licensee is likely
to test the "Category B" option, much less opt for
full Commission review.2 5 ' The certainty inherent in attaining the three-hour threshold is complemented by the broadcasters' ability to comply
without costly legal advice or extensive supplemental justifications.2 52 Moreover, given the increasing value of a television station license, the
beacon of the safe harbor will be too inviting to
resist.

2.

The Communications Act Contemplated Only Very
General Oversight of Broadcasters'Programming
Performance

[l]icensees referred to the Commission should be on
notice by this order that they will not necessarily be
found to have complied with the Children's Television

The Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act")
never contemplated the application of specific
program content and scheduling requirements
on broadcast licensees. Whereas some may complain that lack of definitive requirements is troublesome, Congress eschewed such detailed regula-

243
As stated in the 1996 Report and Order, the Commission "believe[s] that specials, regularly scheduled non-weekly
programs, short-form programs, and PSAs with a significant
purpose of educating and informing children ages 16 and
under can help accomplish the objectives of the Act .
1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 133.
244
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
245
Section 402(b) of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, provides for appeals of FCC licensing decisions
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1994). Therefore, while
a facial challenge to the rules may have been sidestepped via
the industry-government compromise, the prospect of an "as
applied" challenge remains in a case where a licensee suffers
sanctions from the Commission for failure to comply with the
Act.

1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 127.
Id. para. 135.
248
Id. at 10769 (separate statement of Commissioner Susan Ness) (emphasis in original).
249
Id. at 10768.
250
Remarks at the Children's Television Conference, 32
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1363 (July 29, 1996).
251
Some stations may find themselves unexpectedly in
Category B if, for example, they have pre-empted one of
their core programs too often, such that it no longer may be
considered "regularly scheduled."
252
Station licensees value prompt action on their renewal applications. Delay leaves as cloud over the station's
status and can block approval of station sales and related
transactions.
246
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tion of broadcasting and contented itself to
require only that broadcast stations operate in the
public interest. 253 As recognized by the Supreme
Court in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 254 "the Government's power over licensees .

.

. is by no means

absolute and is carefully circumscribed by the Act
itself."255 The Court delineated the limits of government control over broadcast programming,
stating that "Congress has affirmatively indicated
in the Communications Act that certain journalistic decisions are for the licensee, subject only to
the restrictions imposed by evaluation of its overall performance under the public interest standard." 2 5 6 The Court reiterated that a station licensee is "held accountable for the totality of its
performance of public interest obligations."2 5 7
Similarly, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. FCC, 25 8 the Court disavowed the notion that the
FCC could control content of broadcast programming:
In particular, the FCC's oversight responsibilities do
not grant it the power to ordain any particulartype of
programming that must be offered by broadcast stations; for
although "the Commission may inquire of licensees
what they have done to determine the needs of the
community they propose to serve, the Commission may
not impose upon them its private notions of what the
259
public ought to hear."

The Commission's insistence that stations broadcast a narrowly-defined category of "core programming" arguably clashes head on with these
relatively recent pronouncements by the Court restating the very limited role to which the Commission is constrained by the Act.
B.

The Children's Television Act Never
Authorized or Contemplated Adoption of
Any Quantitative Measure of Station
Compliance with the Act
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ceedings are a principal means of government
260
oversight of broadcasting under the 1934 Act.
Congress preserved that mode of regulation in
the Children's Television Act. As described by the
sponsor of the programming provision:
Under this act, the FCC will have the responsibility to
weigh broadcaster's efforts at serving the educational
and informational needs of children in their community, both in the ordinary and comparative renewal situation. To fulfill the required standards, each licensee
must demonstrate that some educational and informational programming targeted specifically at children
was provided. Of course, it is expected that the FCC, in
evaluating the licensee's compliance with this provision, will defer to the licensees [sic] judgment to deterand informational
mine how to serve the educational 26
needs of children in its community. '

Senator Inouye, who managed the bill on the Senate floor in his capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Communications, similarly recognized the wide discretion afforded broadcast
television licensees under the Act:
We have left the licensee the greatest possible flexibility
in how it discharges its public service obligation to children. We recognize that there is a great variety of ways
to serve this unique audience - including programming specially designed to entertain and inform children; family and adult programming that can also contribute to the information needs of children; and
cooperative efforts with noncommercial stations to produce and present educational fare. The list can be extended as far as the imagination of the creative broadgood-faith, dedicated
caster and must rely on the
2 2
judgment of the broadcaster. "

Thus, after the bill was passed, Senator Wirth reiterated:
Of greatest import . . . is the programming require-

ment. Every station must comply. Therefore, each station in a community must offer at least some educational children's programming. No longer will such
content be relegated solely to PBS. No longer will commercial broadcasters be able to get out of the responsibility in that way. The nature of the content offered is
up to the discretion of the broadcaster. Leeway is
granted in deference to broadcasters' first amendment
rights, of course, and with the expectation of good-faith
263
judgments .

Congress resisted crafting the Children's Television Act in a manner inconsistent with the basic
regime established by the 1934 Act. As the Court
pointed out in CBS v. DNC, license renewal pro-

Congress' mandate to the Commission, therefore,
was to accord broadcasters the greatest flexibility
in complying with the Act.

253
47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994) (conferring broad authority
on the Commission to regulate broadcasting as the "public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires").
412 U.S. 94 (1972).
254
255
Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
256
Id. at 120.
257
Id. at 121.
258
114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
259
Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2463 (quoting Network Program-

ming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 25 Fed.
(1960)) (emphasis added).
260
CBS, 412 U.S. at 110.
261
136 CONG. REc. S10127 (daily ed. July
(statement of Sen. Wirth) (emphasis added).
262
136 CONG. REc. S10121-22 (daily ed. July
(statement of Sen. Inouye).
263
136 CONo. REc. S16340 (daily ed. Oct.
(statement of Sen. Wirth).

Reg. 7293
19, 1990)
19, 1990)
22, 1990)
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The Commission embraced this mandate expressly in its initial implementation the Act, acknowledging "the legislative intent to afford
broadcasters maximum flexibility in determining
the 'mix' of programming they will present to
meet children's special needs." 2 6 4 The Commission similarly recognized "the open-minded perspective taken in the legislative history, a perspective consistent with allowing sufficient breadth of
discretion for licensee creativity and sensitivity to
community needs to develop." 2 6 5
Congress's disdain for quantitative requirements vis-a-vis the children's programming requirement was abundantly clear. A quantitative
requirement was anathema. Senator Inouye
stated unambiguously that, "The committee does
not intend that the FCC interpret this legislation
as requiring or mandating quantification standards governing the amount or placement of children's educational and informational programming that a broadcast licensee must air to pass a
license renewal review pursuant to this legislation."2 6 6 Senator Inouye's counterpart in the
House of Representatives, none other than Congressman Edward Markey, echoed the view that a
quantitative measure clashed with the congressional intent that the Commission examine a licensee's overall service to children. Congressman
Markey stated, "The legislation does not require
the FCC to set quantitative guidelines for educational programming, but instead, requires the
Commission to base its decision upon an evaluation of a station's overall service to children."2 67
Congressman Al Swift, a member of the Telecommunications Subcommittee, also emphasized the
general obligation placed on stations in lieu of
specific requirements:
The other thing this bill does, importantly, is to suggest
that local television stations, when they determine what
it is they do to provide service to the community in
1991 Report and Order, supra note 78, para. 18.
Id. para. 20.
266
136 CONG. REc. S10122 (daily ed. July 19, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Inouye).
267
136 CONG. REc. H8537 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey).
268
136 CONG. REc. H5246 (daily ed. July 23, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Swift).
269
See House Report, supra note 23, at 17 ("The committee
does not intend that the FCC interpret this [legislation] as
requiring or mandating a quantification standard governing
the amount or placement of children's educational and informational programming that a broadcast licensee must air
264
265

to pass a license renewal review pursuant to this .

.

. legisla-
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which they are licensed, consider children as an important audience to which they must respond. It does not
dictate specific amounts of time that will be devoted to
children's programming; it does not dictate what kinds
of programming must be used. It simply says, in making that judgment, which they have to do under the license that they get from the Federal Government, to
determine how it is they are going to be dealing with
the community in which they serve, how they are going
to provide their public service time, that children be
one of the audiences seriously considered in providing
that programming.
These two things are so elemental, so simple, so fair, so
just, so prudent and so necessary that it is difficult to
understand why anyone would have any objection.26 8

These views, expressed during the debate were, of
course, consonant with the committee reports for
the bill.26 9
In 1991, the Commission itself embraced this
view of the Act:
The Act imposes no quantitative standards and the legislative history suggests that Congress meant that no minimum amount criterionbe imposed. Given this strong legislative direction, and the latitude afforded broadcasters
in fulfilling the programming requirement, we believe
that the amount of "specifically designed" programming necessary to comply with the Act's requirement is
likely to vary according to other circumstances, including but not limited to, type of programming aired and
other nonbroadcast efforts made by the station. We
thus decline to establish any minimum programming
requirement for licensees for renewal review independent of that established in the Act. 270

One easily might argue, therefore, that the Commission's new quantitative processing guideline
clashes head on with the Act, the underlying Congressional intent, and the Commission's own
prior perception of its mandate under the Act.
In response to such a claim the Commission
would bear the especially heavy burden of explaining and justifying a complete reversal of its
prior position. 271 In changing its interpretation
of the Act in its 1996 Report and Order, the Commission provides only a terse paragraph. 2 72
tion."); see also Senate Report, supra note 23, at 23.
270
1991 Report and Order, supra note 78, para. 24 (emphasis added).
271
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F. 2d
841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("But an agency changing its
course must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior
policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not
casually ignored, and if an agency glosses over or swerves
from prior precedents without discussion it may cross the
line from the tolerably terse to the intolerably mute.") (footnote omitted) .
272
1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 129. In essence the Commission offers two justifications for its new interpretation of the Act. First, it says that "nothing in the stat-

24

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

Whether it is tolerably so is a point worthy of contention.
C.

Certain Aspects of the Commission's Order
May Constitute Impermissibly Arbitrary and
Capricious Agency Action in Contravention
of the Administrative Procedure Act

An agency decision which is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law" must be set aside.2 73 To
avoid such a result "the agency must examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection
between the facts found and the choice
made.' "274
. Several avenues of attack on the 1996 Report
and Order would be available under the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard of the APA. First, the
Commission's processing guideline arguably is a
solution to a problem which does not exist. Such
"solutions" have suffered especially harsh treatment in the courts.2 75 The Commission's fundamental rationale is an insufficient amount of programming specifically designed to meet the
educational and informational needs of children
and the underlying cause of such deficiency - a
marketplace failure resulting from the economic
inability of even well-intentioned stations to
schedule a sufficient amount of such programming due to competitive pressures from other stations. The record before the Commission, however, arguably demonstrates that stations, at least
on average, already broadcast three or more
hours of indisputably core programming. 2 76 if
this could be shown, then neither of the Commission's rationales makes sense. If no shortfall exutory language ... forbids the use of a processing guideline."
Id. Secondly, the Commission contends that the processing
guideline would remedy the shortcomings of its initial rules.
Id. The first argument ignores express, unambiguous legislative history. The second mightjustify a processing guideline,
but fails to address how the statute should be interpreted to
reach such a conclusion.
273
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)
(1994) ("APA").
274 Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins., Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
275 See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36
(D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[A] regulation perfectly reasonable and
appropriate in the face of a given problem may be highly capricious if that problem does not exist.") (citation omitted).
276 The NAB and INTV studies found that stations, in-
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ists, if stations by and large are providing more
core programming than the Commission considers minimally acceptable, then a requirement to
broadcast that amount of programming is a needless and hollow gesture. Furthermore, if most stations already are exceeding the criterion despite
the fact that a few of their competitors are doing
less, then the Commission's marketplace equalization rationale has no basis in fact. Broadcasters
simply are not behaving the way the Commission
fears they would in the absence of a requirement.
Indeed, one might argue with some force that
the rule will be counterproductive. This "minimum becomes the maximum" argument takes on
added weight if one accepts the Commission thesis that marketplace considerations discourage
the broadcast of core programming. In that circumstance, stations logically would be expected to
provide no more than what is actually required of
them - three hours per week of core programming and not one minute more. If the average
amount of time devoted to core programming
now exceeds three hours per week, then the average will decline to three hours as every station
gravitates to the minimum level of performance
dictated by the three-hour processing guideline.
On an overall basis, however, less core programming will be available - a result contrary to the
Commission's desire to increase the amount of
core programming and hardly the epitome of rational agency decisionmaking.
Pointed questions also might be directed at the
Commission's selection of a three-hour standard.
The stated rationale appears rooted in broadcasters' supposed belief that the three-hour standard
is reasonable and achievable. The same could be
said of a two-hour or a one-hour requirement.
deed, were providing in excess of three hours per week of
core programming on average. RICHARD V. DucEY & MARK R.
FRATRIK, NAB, THE 1990 CHILDEN's TELEVISION ACT: A SECOND LOOK ON ITs IMPACT 3 (1995) (as appended to NAB
Comments, supra note 7, Attachment 1); ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., 1995 STATUS REPORT
ON CHILDREN'S EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMMING 11 (1995) (as ap-

pended to INTV Comments, supra note 96, Exhibit A) [hereinafter INTV 1995 Study]. The Commission discounted the results of studies submitted by broadcast interests. 1996 Report
and Order, supra note 2, para. 40. This action alone might be
considered arbitrary. For example, INTV (now ALTV) was
very sensitive to the improper inclusion of programs like The
Flintstones in stations' listings of core programming and
sought to avoid such definition problems in its survey. INTV

1995 Study, at 12.
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More to the point, if children and their parents
are the purported beneficiaries of the rule, ought
not the rationale be rooted in an effort to optimize that benefit? One might presume that the
Commission would respond that when it comes to
core programming, more is better, and that the
ability of broadcasters to achieve a level of performance at an acceptable cost (including opportunity cost to the viewing public as well as broadcasters) is the only constraint on the amount to be
required. Courts, however, typically are reluctant
to presume why agencies have chosen to act in a
certain way. 277
Finally, the Commission might be pressed to explain why clearly beneficial program genres have
been excluded from consideration as core programming.2 78 The narrow definition adopted by
the Commission is additionally suspect because
the Act itself contemplates consideration of a
broader range of programming in evaluating a licensee's compliance with the Act.2 79
D.

A Quantitative Standard May Violate the
First Amendment Rights of Broadcasters

Whereas the Chairman was correct in reminding Commissioner Quello that the Commission has applied formal processing guidelines in
the past, 28 0 the constitutionality of those guidelines never was tested and certainly not in the current video programming marketplace. Judicial review of the new children's programming
processing guideline would provide the opportunity for a constitutional test of a quantitative
processing guideline, although the existence of
other grounds for overturning the guideline likely
would permit a reviewing court to avoid the constitutional question.28 1
277
See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371
U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962). Appellate courts also must assure
themselves that an agency has articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action. See id.
278
1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 111.
279
47 U.S.C. § 303b(a)(2) (1994) ("[T]he Commission

shall, in its review of any application for renewal . . . consider
to the extent to which the licensee . . . has served the educa-

tional and informational needs of children through the licensee's overall programming,including programming specifically designed to serve such needs.") (emphasis added).
280
See Hundt Univ. of Pittsburgh Remarks, supra note 127,
at 6. Those processing guidelines were eliminated in the television deregulation proceeding over a decade ago in large
part because the Commission found that the radio and television industries on the whole were providing amounts of the

25

In any case, the petitioner would have to determine whether to seek reversal of the venerable,
but, perhaps, outdated standard enunciated in
Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC. 28 2 In
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the
Supreme Court acknowledged a history of jurisprudence that supports Red Lion's doctrine of according broadcasting a lesser degree of protection based on the "special physical characteristics
of broadcast transmissions."28 3 Because spectrum
is limited, not everyone can be a broadcaster.
Therefore, those who are licensed to use the
broadcast spectrum may be subject to more government oversight than other organs of the
press. 28 4 The Court so far has "declined to question" the continuing validity of Red Lion, but is
well-aware that it is a suspect doctrine.28 5
The line of attack on Red Lion is neither mysterious nor subtle. Whereas spectrum limitations
inherently may limit the number of persons who
may communicate to the public via broadcasting,
numerous other media now provide other means
of reaching the broadcast audience. Red Lion
was decided at a time when broadcast television
consisted primarily of a limited number of powerful VHF stations concentrated in large markets,
virtually all of which were affiliated with one of
three national television networks. Moreover,
broadcasting was the only video news and entertainment medium. This is hardly the case today. As observed by Commissioner Quello in the
heat of the children's television debate:
Today, there is a superabundance of program choices
- over 1,500 full power television stations, including 4
networks, 2 additional emerging networks, 363 noncommercial educational stations, and more than 1,600
low power stations ....
Nor is broadcast television even the dominant player in
the video marketplace any more. Today, cable televirequisite programming in excess of the levels established in
the processing guidelines. 1984 CommercializationReport and
Order, supra note 3, para. 2.
281
See supra notes 275 and accompanying text.
282
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
283
Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445,
2457 (1994) (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal.,
468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); FCC v. National Citizens Comm.
for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at
390).
284
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 398. ("[Ilt is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.").
285
See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2457.
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sion reaches 97 percent of all television homes and 63
percent of households subscribe. Cable's 135 program
networks, with 60 more in the planning stages, have
brought an undreamed-of diversity of programming
that responds to virtually every conceivable want and
wish. DBS, MMDS, and, soon, video dialtone systems
will augment and extend this array of programming.
Also vying for the hearts and minds and eyes of the
viewer are the Internet and VCRs, which are now in 82
percent of all homes.2 8 "

Broadcast television does remain unique in that
it is a free, locally-based, ubiquitous service. However, the emergence of other media by which
speakers may transmit programming to the public
does raise valid questions about the vitality of the
spectrum scarcity rationale - which was based on
the inability of all speakers to gain access to a
channel of communications to the public, not on
the fact that broadcasting was a free, universal service. Any serious challenger to the new children's
television rules would find it hard to resist a headon challenge to Red Lion.
Even assuming the validity of Red Lion, a serious constitutional attack could be mounted
against the new rules. As noted above, the Court
in Turner repeatedly emphasized the constraints
on the Commission's power to regulate broadcasting.28 7 The Court was very particular in stating
that the FCC lacks the power to prescribe specific
types of programming which stations must broadcast.28 8 The instructive examples used by the
Court hit very close to home regarding the new
children's television rules. The Turner Court described the nature of the requirements imposed
on noncommercial licensees with respect to educational programming:
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"limited content restraints imposed by statute and
FCC regulation" on broadcasters. 29 0 Notably, the
Court characterized the Act as "directing [the]
FCC to consider [the] extent to which [a broadcast] license renewal applicant has 'served the educational and informational needs of children.'" 2 9 Faced with a constitutional challenge
to the FCC's new rules, the Court would find it
difficult to distance itself from such recent elaborations on its views of the proper scope of broadcast content regulation.
The Commission's truncated First Amendment
defense of the rules would have to be addressed.
First, the Commission says, most of the arguments
used to attack the Commission's proposals are
"not applicable" because the Commission has
adopted a flexible processing guideline in lieu of
a rule.29 2 As observed by one legal scholar, however:
For First Amendment purposes, the imposition of a
minimum number of hours of specifically defined programming [sic] violates established constitutional
norms whether the regulatory mechanism is a safe harbor quantitative processing guideline. or a flat-out rule;
in constitutional terms, these two options present a distinction without a difference, for in either case the government is effectively imposing affirmative obligations
on broadcasters to air programs falling within a definition established by the government within time parameters established by the government for a minimum
29 3
number of hours established by the government.

The Court also cited the Children's Television Act
as an illustration of the sort of permissible, but

Thus, whether this is a "distinction without a difference" or a loophole of sufficient dimension to
forestall constitutional jeopardy would be a material issue for a reviewing court.
The FCC also relies on judicial approval of rules
requiring broadcast stations to provide reasonable
294
access to candidates for federal elective office.
Like the new children's television rules, the Commission asserts, the reasonable access provision
also requires stations "to air certain types of programming they might not otherwise choose to
provide."29 5 Several distinctions might be raised
in response to the Commission's position. First,

See Quello NAB Remarks, supra note 126, at 3-4; see also
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F. 2d 654, 684-85 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (Starr, J. concurring).
287
Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2463 (quoting Network Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 25 Fed. Reg. 7293
(1960)).
288
Id.
289
Id. at 2,463 (quoting En Banc ProgrammingInquiry, 44
F.C.C.2d 2303, 2312 (1960)).
290 Id. at 2,462.

Id. at 2,462 n.7 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303b (1994)).
1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 151.
293
NAB Comments, supra note 7, Attachment 6, at 6-7
(Statement of Rodney A. Smolla, Professor and Director of
the Institute of Bill of Rights Law, College of William and
Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law) [hereinafter Smolla
Statement].
294
1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 150 (citing
to Columbia Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
295
Id. para. 150.

What is important for present purposes, however, is
that noncommercial licensees are not required by statute or regulation to carry any specific quantity of "educational" programming or any particular "educational"
programs. Noncommercial licensees, like their commercial counterparts, need only adhere to the general
requirement that their programming serve "the public
289
interest, convenience or necessity."

286

291

292
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the reasonable access provision is directed at a
problem resulting from perceived spectrum scarcity, the inability of all speakers (and in particular,
candidates) to secure access to a broadcast channel. Thus, as in Red Lion, the provision in question was designed to assure access to viewpoints
on matters of public concern. This is a far cry
from rules effectively requiring stations to broadcast a specific amount of a very specific type of
programming. No suggestion has been made that
spectrum scarcity is a factor in stations' decisions
to broadcast or not to broadcast educational programming for children. As the Court noted in
upholding the reasonable access requirement, it
29 6
was a "limited right to 'reasonable access'
which did "not impair the discretion of broadcasters to present their views on any issue or to carry
any particular type of programming."2 9 7 Furthermore, as Professor Smolla posits, "[T]he First
Amendment 'window' opened by Red Lion and its
progeny has been limited to regulations aimed
narrowly at ensuring equality of access in public
debate and the channeling of indecent programming."2 98 Second, as noted above, unlike the reasonable access provision, quantitative children's
programming standards enjoy no statutory basis.
Indeed, they clash with the clearly expressed intent of Congress.2 99
The Commission also asserted that the new
rules would survive heightened constitutional
scrutiny (assuming the demise of Red Lion) because they advance a compelling interest - the
intellectual development of our nation's children
- and are narrowly tailored.30 0 It claims the
rules "are no more burdensome than necessary to
ensure that children will be able to watch educational and informational programming."o3 0 The
Commission then emphasizes the flexibility accorded stations under the processing guideline.
None of this can obscure the fact that the Commission may have imposed rules to increase educational and informational children's programming which not only is demonstrably unnecessary,
CBS v. FCC, 452 U.S. at 396 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 397.
298
Smolla Statement, supra note 293, at 8.
299
See supra notes 260-72 and accompanying text.
300
1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, paras. 156-57.
301
Id. para. 157.
302
See supra notes 230-232 and accompanying text.
303
Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2470
(1994) (citing Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F. 2d 1434,
1455 (D.C. Cir. 1985)) ("When the Government defends a
296
297
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but possibly counterproductive.3 0 2 Indeed, as Justice Kennedy pointed out in Turner, the importance of the government's interest does not automatically lead to the conclusion that a rule will
advance those interests.30 3
VI.

CONCLUSION

Nothing said herein is to denigrate politics (as
usual or otherwise) or the influence of political
forces on the deliberations and decision of the
Federal Communications Commission. Indeed,
to suggest that the FCC ought remain aloof or insulated from political pressure would be naive
and unrealistic. Moreover, it would deny the
need for political accountability essential in a democracy.
Similarly, no implication that the Commission
should discard or discount the views of the wellmeaning advocates of better children's programming is intended. The rights and interests of children certainly are a proper concern of government, and the FCC would be remiss in turning a
blind eye to the needs of children.
At the same time, the FCC, as an administrative
agency, operates in a legal framework which is
designed to assure that its decisions are products
of reason and reality, not just whim, caprice, or
even the best of intentions. The Bill of Rights (of
which the First Amendment is the most prominent article) also exists to assure that a
majoritarian political viewpoint does not trample
fundamental freedoms. Therefore, the Commission also must be accountable to its statutory mandate and the Constitution. The sensitivity of the
FCC to the legal and constitutional limits on its
authority must be especially acute when, as in the
case of children's television, considerable political
pressure and undeniably good intentions weigh
heavily on the Commission's decision making process.
Whether the Commission was sufficiently sensitive to legal and constitutional constraints in
regulation on speech as a means to redress past harms or
prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply
'posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured."') (citation omitted); see also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2350
(1995) ("While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct
in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with
speech for no better reason than promoting an approved
message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.").
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adopting a quantitative standard for children's
television programming will remain a matter of
academic, but apparently, not, judicial interest.
Significant legal and constitutional issues will linger momentarily in the wake of the Commission's
decision and in all likelihood will fade from view.
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This is unfortunate, not only because the issues
are serious and the precedent worrisome, but also
because sound reasons exist to question whether
the FCC's new rules actually will improve programming for children.

